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The “smart growth” movement has had a significant influence on land
use regulation over the past few decades, and promises to offer the antidote to
suburban sprawl.  But states and local governments that once enthusiastically
touted smart growth legislation are beginning to confront unforeseen obstacles
and unintended consequences resulting from their new policies.  This Article
explores the impact of growth management acts on private property rights,
noting the inevitable and growing conflicts between the two sides that legisla-
tures and courts are now being asked to sort out.  It assesses the problems with
creating truly intelligent urban growth, ranging from political motivations to
inconsistent judicial determinations to NIMBYs to constitutional takings
jurisprudence.
This Article predicts dramatically increased land use litigation as the
likely result of smart growth legislation in the coming decades unless legisla-
tures and courts enact sensible reforms today.  If we want “smart growth” to
live up to its name, we must remove it from local politics, get serious about
consistently enforcing urban growth boundaries or priority funding areas, and
even consider reforming America’s individualistic notion of private property
rights as we know it.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, ever-expanding urban and suburban
growth in the United States has offered a clear sign of America’s eco-
nomic vitality, but it has not come without unique challenges of its
own.  Indeed, efforts to promulgate “smart growth” legislation as an
antidote to suburban sprawl have proliferated in the past three de-
cades, but it is time we ask ourselves whether their benefits outweigh
their unintended consequences.  States and local governments that
once enthusiastically touted such legislation are beginning to confront
unforeseen obstacles—and litigation—that raise the need for immedi-
ate reform.  This Article explores the impact of growth management
acts on preexisting property rights, noting the inevitable and growing
conflicts between the two sides that legislatures (and courts) are in-
creasingly being forced to confront.  We assess the problems with cre-
ating truly intelligent urban and suburban growth, from political
pressures to inconsistent judicial determinations to NIMBYs1 and
even constitutional takings jurisprudence.
Let us briefly consider a few examples that highlight the nature of
the land use and property law conflicts involved: Point Wells, Wash-
ington; Rajneeshpuram, Oregon; and Windsor Tract, Florida.
Point Wells, a scenic area designated to become a luxury condo-
minium development, rests on the Puget Sound waterfront.2  Formerly
owned by Standard Oil and used as a fuel facility,3 this area contains
beautiful beachfront property nearly a mile long, with stunning views
of Puget Sound and the Olympic Mountains beyond.4  It is nestled on
the southern part of Snohomish County, and is adjacent to the north-
ernmost city—Shoreline—of another county, King County.5  When
1 NIMBY is an acronym for “Not In My Back Yard,” an expression of opposition to the
locating of an undesirable project close by in one’s neighborhood. See NIMBY, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nimby (last visited May 10,
2015).
2 BSRE Point Wells, LP, Point Wells. . . A New Vision for Living, POINT WELLS, http://
pointwells.com (last visited May 10, 2015) [hereinafter Vision].
3 Noah Haglund, Status of Point Wells Still in Limbo, HERALDNET (July 16, 2013, 12:01
AM), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20130716/NEWS01/707169935.
4 See Vision, supra note 2. R
5 See Haglund, supra note 3. R
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developer Blue Square Real Estate6 decided to create a residential
community there, it was not difficult to appreciate the enormous fi-
nancial rewards of constructing dwellings featuring “million dollar
views.”  Blue Square’s proposed plan for Point Wells would create the
largest condominium development in Snohomish County, with 3000
luxury units, retail spaces, and a public pier.7
The fate of Point Wells, however, was not that simple.  Situated
between two cities, Woodway and Shoreline, Washington, and without
any preexisting services of its own, the negative externalities8 required
to support a community of its size would largely fall upon Point
Wells’s relatively small neighbor to the south, Shoreline.9  In order to
get permission to develop, however, Blue Square successfully lobbied
its northern neighbor, Snohomish County, to designate this former
fuel facility as an “urban center” for land use purposes.10  This redesig-
nation of a significant tract of land—positioned, as it was, closely to
other municipalities—raised all the important questions of land use
with which states across the country are grappling.  To introduce a
community of the size suggested by its developers implicated issues of
resource management, environmental preservation, affordable hous-
ing, housing density, and negative externalities: in other words, the
myriad of intersecting issues at play whenever urban (or suburban)
sprawl occurs.
Just to the south in Oregon’s Cascade Mountains, when a medita-
tion center sought incorporation as its own city, a non-profit advocacy
organization opposed its incorporation on the grounds that it would
increase urban expansion in an unauthorized area.11  Determining
whether incorporating the new city of “Rajneeshpuram” on a 64,000-
acre ranch was legally permissible depended on whether or not incor-
poration constituted a “land use decision.”12  This lawsuit implicated
questions of county versus city powers, including the ability to desig-
6 Blue Square Real Estate is a large petroleum and real estate company with holdings in
Israel, Europe, and the United States.  Haglund, supra note 3. R
7 Id.
8 Economists typically define negative externalities as costs or harms that are created by
one person’s activity but fall onto another party. See, e.g., EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 18–20 (2d ed. 1990).
9 See Haglund, supra note 3. R
10 See Vision, supra note 2; see also Brief for Futurewise as Amicus Curiae Supporting R
Petitioners at 8–9, Town of Woodway v. Snohomish Cnty., 322 P.3d 1219 (Wash. 2014) (No.
88405-6), 2013 WL 5676370.
11 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco Cnty. Ct., 703 P.2d 207, 213 (Or. 1985).
12 Id.
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nate areas to fall within Oregon’s famous land use planning tool: an
urban growth boundary (“UGB”).13
Across the country in a Florida wetland area known as Windsor
Tract, developer Estuary Properties had plans for massive residential
and commercial building.14  Estuary sought to develop 6500 acres of
land, including 2800 acres of coastal rim.15  The property was home to
red and black mangrove forests.16  Estuary had big plans—anticipating
housing as many as 73,500 people in the space, creating some twenty-
seven man-made lakes, and changing the elevation and topography of
the land.17  Anticipated destruction of forestland was the most contro-
versial element of the proposal.18
Because of the location of the proposed development and the an-
ticipated environmental impact, the governing board of county com-
missioners denied Estuary a permit.19  On appeal, the court was asked
to consider the competing interests of the developer’s private property
rights—and whether or not denial of a development permit consti-
tuted a “taking”—and the interests of the surrounding region, such as
the environmental impact on forests, waterways, and population
growth.20  Although the developer initially won an order providing for
its development permit over regional environmental objections,21 the
Florida Supreme Court ultimately handed a victory to neighboring
landowners, stating:
The concern of public officials over environmentally endan-
gered lands is a laudable one and is shared by all of our citi-
zens.  On the other hand, the right of an individual to own
and enjoy property was one of the foundation stones on
which our government was formed.  As government grows
the individual property rights diminish, for we focus our at-
tention on the welfare of the majority at the expense, and
ultimate destruction, of the property owner. If one founda-
tion stone crumbles, our form of government will fall.22
13 See id. at 214, 217.
14 Estuary Props., Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff’d in




18 Id. at 1129.
19 Id. at 1129–31.
20 Id. at 1139.
21 Id. at 1140.
22 Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1385 (Fla. 1981), aff’g in part, rev’g in
part Askew, 381 So. 2d at 1126.
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The Florida Supreme Court’s language, and indeed the problems
highlighted in each of the above-mentioned lawsuits, identifies the
growing tension between environmental welfare and private property
rights in the United States.  This tension touches upon a broad, long-
running, and interdisciplinary challenge faced by the American legal
system: smart land use, and the much-discussed issue of sprawl.23  Ef-
forts to make wise, coordinated land use planning a priority have been
met with extreme political and legal difficulties.24  Much of this diffi-
culty is rooted in the very nature of private property rights in the
United States.
At its core the problem is this: land is a finite resource, and its use
has significant effects on quality of life, environmental sustainability,
and fundamental fairness.  Given the growing conflicts created by
sprawl, our legal system can and must do a much better job of passing
effective legislation to combat and resolve these conflicts in a sensible
way.  We must also consistently uphold and interpret that legislation
to provide predictability and stability to private property holders,
while stemming the tide of litigation that has been coming our way.
This Article explores the problems inherent in many states’ noble
efforts to enact sensible growth management laws, and offers norma-
tive suggestions for meaningful reform.  Part I provides historical
background with respect to the development of private property rights
in America, including some important implications for land use and
growth management.  We address (the failure of) national land use
planning efforts and the resulting problem of sprawl that consumed
much public discourse over the past few decades, as well as other legal
impediments to sensible growth management.  Part II details the rise
of the “smart growth” movement as the legal antidote to sprawl, ex-
amining the well-meaning but internally conflicting growth manage-
ment legislation efforts passed by several states.25  Not surprisingly,
substantial litigation has been the inevitable result, and neither pre-
23 See, e.g., REID EWING ET AL., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, ENDANGERED BY SPRAWL: HOW
RUNAWAY DEVELOPMENT THREATENS AMERICA’S WILDLIFE (2005), available at http://www.
nwf.org/pdf/Wildlife/EndangeredBySprawl.pdf; Reid Ewing et al., Relationship Between Urban
Sprawl and Physical Activity, Obesity, and Morbidity, 18 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 47 (2003);
Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183 (1997).
24 See, e.g., 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW & GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 3:1, at
3-2 (2d ed. 2002).
25 At least thirteen states have tried their hand at smart growth legislation: Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington. See David R. Godschalk, Smart Growth Efforts Around
the Nation, POPULAR GOV’T, Fall 2000, at 12, 13, available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/elec
tronicversions/pg/pgfal00/article2.pdf.
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dictability nor smart growth has necessarily been enhanced.  Part III
further analyzes these efforts in order to identify common problems in
growth management from which we need to learn lest we repeat the
failures of the past.  Finally, Part IV offers bold legal and public policy
solutions to these common dilemmas that legislators can and should
take up immediately.  We must remove smart growth efforts from lo-
cal political manipulation, and create durable land use solutions that
address the inherent conflicts of interest involved.  If we fail to do so,
smart growth efforts will surely never be capable of living up to their
name.
I. THE NATURE OF U.S. PROPERTY RIGHTS MAKES GROWTH
MANAGEMENT AN UPHILL BATTLE
A. The Development of Private Property Rights in the United States
The concept of private property rights in the United States has a
long history dating back to the ancient Romans and Celts.26  Roman
law identified the property owner’s right to use, enjoy, and transfer his
land to others.27  Roman soldiers were even rewarded with parcels of
land for their service.28  The high value placed on private property
rights in Roman law was passed down to the Anglo-American com-
mon law of property.29  The English conception of property rights fluc-
tuated after the Norman Conquest, but as one author put it, “In all
this history, one constant has been the keen interest in, and powerful
motivation proffered by, the prospects of acquiring private ownership
rights in land.”30
It was not, however, until the founding of the American colonies
that a never-before-seen celebration of full private property rights
came into being.31  Not only was owning one’s own land an indication
of social standing, it was considered essential to reach one’s “happiest
26 See David A. Thomas, Why the Public Plundering of Private Property Rights Is Still a
Very Bad Idea, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 25, 34–37 (2006).
27 Id. at 35.
28 Id. at 37.
29 Id. at 40.  Though it exceeds, in some regard, the scope of this Article, this notion of
private property rights need not have won the day.  Were there a different cultural and legal
understanding of communal and public use of land, our current conception of growth manage-
ment could have been quite different.
30 Id. at 46.
31 Id.
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and most productive potential.”32  Land ownership has thus been part
of the American dream since colonial Jamestown and Plymouth.33
As the American common law of property developed, the indi-
vidual rights of the property owner have remained strong.  One who
invests in a parcel of land is considered to own that parcel down to the
center of the earth and as high as the heavens above.34  There is a
strong connection between land ownership and a sense of American
identity—exhibited not only in the robust defense of an owner’s indi-
vidual property rights, but also in disparate areas such as criminal
law35 and privacy law.36
Of course, within the history of the “American dream” of land
ownership, key players have been historically excluded.  Persons of
color, women, and immigrants, for example, faced barriers distinct
from those of freed white men.37  To this day, the difference in prop-
erty values based on one’s race makes property ownership (as com-
pared to renting) more difficult for persons born into lower means, or
persons who by virtue of their skin color will likely own property with
a lower value.38
32 Id.
33 Id. at 46, 52.
34 See Matt Soniak, Do You Own the Space Above Your House?, MENTAL FLOSS (June 25,
2012, 11:08 AM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/31018/do-you-own-space-above-your-house (ad-
dressing whether one literally owns all the air space above one’s house and ground space below).
Soniak writes:
Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos means “whoever owns the
soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.”  This property right principle
asserts that a person who owns a particular piece of land owns everything directly
above and below that piece of land, no matter the distance, and can prosecute tres-
passers who violate their border on the surface, underground and in the sky.  But
has that held up in court over the years?
Despite the Latin phrasing, the principle was not a part of classical Roman law, and is usually
attributed to the 13th-century Italian scholar Accursius.  It made its way to England and was first
used in the English-speaking world by Sir Edward Coke, an Elizabethan-era lawyer/judge/politi-
cian.  It gained wider popularity in Commentaries on the Laws of England (1766), a treatise by
judge and jurist William Blackstone.
35 For example, consider the more generous “stand your ground” laws when one acts in
self-defense on one’s own property—otherwise known as the “Castle doctrine.” See Debate
Club: Are ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws a Good Idea?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://
www.usnews.com/debate-club/are-stand-your-ground-laws-a-good-idea (last visited May 17,
2015).
36 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (even dwindling Fourth Amend-
ment protections were upheld by a Scalia-authored majority opinion because the case implicated
one’s home).
37 See generally DAVID HILFIKER, URBAN INJUSTICE: HOW GHETTOS HAPPEN (2002).
38 Id.
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In the end, the almost-sacred nature with which the law has
treated American property owners has significant implications for
proponents of smart growth.  First, the extensive power afforded to
states, local governments, and individuals to control land use decisions
has made it difficult to achieve national coordination of land use plan-
ning.39  Second, the notion that every American deserves a certain
kind of home40 contributes to the problem of suburban sprawl that
land use planning efforts have sought to address.
B. National Land Use Planning Efforts (and their Failure)
There have been multiple significant efforts to engage in nation-
wide land use planning.41  An early example came as part of the New
Deal’s efforts to combat the economic effects of the Great Depres-
sion—particularly with regard to farmers. 42  In 1938, the Secretary of
Agriculture, Henry Wallace, developed a planning scheme for farmers
to address their collective needs, in which they would form local plan-
ning boards, county boards, and state boards, all of which ultimately
reported to the Secretary in Washington.43  Professor Todd Wilder-
muth has characterized this movement as a “gentle entry into national
planning” as it was “chiefly procedural, limited to agricultural lands,
and generated from the bottom up.”44
However, before this New Deal national agricultural planning
movement could demonstrate success, it was stopped short in its
tracks.45  A combination of political and economic shifts, including
Secretary Wallace’s departure from the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, a failed attempt to delegate control locally rather than seeking
national cohesion, and the beginning of World War II, led to the dis-
mantling of the New Deal agricultural land use program.46
39 See generally Godschalk, supra note 25. R
40 “A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted . . . .”
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
41 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2012); Clean Water Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)); Agriculture
Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31; National Park Service Organic Act, Pub.
L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2012)); see generally
Todd A. Wildermuth, National Land Use Planning in America, Briefly, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 73 (2005).
42 Wildermuth, supra note 41, at 75–76. R
43 Id.
44 Id. at 75.
45 Id. at 76.
46 Id. at 76–77.
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The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a second attempt at national land
use planning, as environmental consciousness began to dawn in
America.  Enactment of the Clean Air Act,47 the National Environ-
mental Policy Act,48 and celebration of the first Earth Day49 all took
place during this time frame.50  In 1970, the next logical step appeared
to be near as Senator Henry Jackson introduced the National Land
Use Policy Bill.51  Under this proposal, the federal government would
fund states’ efforts to compile necessary data for land use planning,
and then make coordinated decisions regarding where federal funding
should go based on the data.52  The Land Use Policy Bill—and various
iterations of it—was discussed in Congress every year from 1970 to
1975, but the bill never reached the President’s desk for signature.53
Opposition from various political actors including President Richard
Nixon and the Chamber of Commerce thwarted the bill’s progress
each time around.54
C. Sprawl
The individualistic cultural understanding of private property
rights is not merely a thorn in the side of those who would like to see
sensible national land use efforts succeed.  The trend towards stronger
and stronger private property rights, particularly the suburban Ameri-
can dream55 of low-density residential housing (with a lawn, a white
picket fence, and a two-door garage), have created one of the largest
planning problems: sprawl.
There are competing definitions of the term “sprawl.”  Fre-
quently, sprawl is categorized as low-density development that ex-
pands in a “leapfrog”56 or “hopscotch”57 pattern outward from
previously settled areas, typically “near a deteriorating central city or
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).
49 The first Earth Day took place on April 22, 1970. See Wildermuth, supra note 41, at 77 R
n.19 (citing PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT 111–28 (1993)).
50 See Wildermuth, supra note 41, at 77. R
51 National Land Use Policy Act, S. 3354, 91st Cong. (1970); see alsoWildermuth, supra
note 41, at 77 (citing NOREEN LYDAY, THE LAW OF THE LAND: DEBATING NATIONAL LAND USE R
LEGISLATION, 1970–1975 (1976)).
52 Wildermuth, supra note 41, at 77–78. R
53 Id. at 78.
54 Id. at 78–79.
55 See Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (indicating that the proper role of
government regarding sprawl would be to “lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people”).
56 See Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable Develop-
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town.”58  Some say that sprawl has a more ephemeral, “I-know-it-
when-I-see-it” sort of quality.59  Others state that sprawl “can occur
anywhere within or adjoining a metropolitan region, without any nec-
essary connection to the core city.”60
A more accurate definition of sprawl focuses narrowly on the tan-
gible forms that sprawl assumes on the landscape.  Generally, these
forms include detached, single-family homes, set far from the curb, on
large lots, in (almost) purely residential neighborhoods, containing
wide streets upon which residents will drive to jobs and shopping cen-
ters in potentially distant commercial zones61—in other words, all of
the built forms more commonly referred to as “suburban.”62
The near-complete separation of residential and commercial land
uses is probably sprawl’s most evident attribute.  As urban planner
Oliver Gillham put it, residential housing is confined to subdivisions
connecting to form an “unbroken fabric of privately owned land di-
vided only by public roads.”63  The physical appearance of these sub-
divisions, when viewed from above, can seem harshly monotonous—
in the words of folk singer Malvina Reynolds, like “little boxes made
of ticky-tacky . . . [a]nd they all look just the same.”64  Meanwhile,
commercial zones are generally typified by the strip mall—that is, the
ubiquitous form of retail and office development “configured in long,
low boxes or small pavilions surrounded by multiple acres of surface
parking” and arranged alongside “huge arterial roads.”65
ment in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape, 11
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26, 29 (2003).
57 See Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even in a City Without Zon-
ing), 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1175 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58 Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth and the Fifth Amend-
ment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 (2000).
59 Id.
60 OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE URBAN SPRAWL DEBATE 8
(2002).
61 See id. (defining “sprawl” as “a form of urbanization distinguished by leapfrog patterns
of development, commercial strips, low density, separated land uses, automobile dominance, and
a minimum of public open space”).
62 Id. (“Suburbanization is the spread of suburban development patterns across a region
or a nation—that is, the proliferation of sprawl forms of urbanization across a region or
nation.”).
63 Id. at 7.
64 MALVINA REYNOLDS, Little Boxes, on EAR TO THE GROUND (Smithsonian Folkways
Recordings 2000) (this song accompanies the opening credits of the hit Showtime television
show Weeds, which paints a subversive portrait of a suburban mother).
65 GILLHAM, supra note 60, at 5. R
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The negative effects of sprawl are so numerous as to be the sub-
ject of many independent articles.66  Briefly, sprawl has been demon-
strated to contribute to higher rates of obesity,67 undermine wildlife
preservation,68 and impede access to affordable housing.69
D. Legal Impediments to Growth Management
There are numerous legal concerns, aside from the jurisprudence
concerning property rights, with which smart growth advocates must
contend.  Among them are: (1) substantive due process rights, (2) the
Takings Clause, (3) restrictions on exclusionary zoning, and (4) the
Equal Protection Clause, and the Fair Housing Act.70  Although these
may, at first, appear to be insurmountable barriers to the enactment of
effective smart growth legislation, the standard for invalidating a
growth management law under any given legal framework is difficult
to meet.  Each legal hurdle is discussed briefly.
1. Substantive Due Process
Land use and zoning decisions may not violate a person’s consti-
tutional rights, including substantive due process.  However, judicial
interpretation of whether a due process right has been violated will
take into account the police power of a state with regard to land use.71
Land use regulation may not be conducted in a way that is unconstitu-
tionally arbitrary and capricious.72  Developers and residents both
have substantive due process rights.73  Though substantive due process
66 See Reid H. Ewing, Characteristics, Causes, and Effects of Sprawl: A Literature Review,
in URBAN ECOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
HUMANS AND NATURE 519, 525–26 (John M. Marzluff et al. eds., 2008); EWING ET AL., supra
note 23; Ewing et al., supra note 23; Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 23. R
67 Ewing et al., supra note 23 (discussing the relationship between sprawl and physical R
activity).
68 EWING ET AL., supra note 23, at vii. R
69 See Ewing, supra note 66, at 521 (describing how sprawl limits accessibility). R
70 See generally 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW & GROWTH MANAGEMENT, § 3:1
(Nov. 2013 ed.).
71 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); see also Disney v.
City of Concord, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58, 60–64 (1st Dist. 2011) (finding that a city ordinance was a
constitutionally permissible exercise of its police power and did not violate resident’s substantive
due process rights).
72 See, e.g., United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399,
402 (3d Cir. 2003); Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 154 F.3d 621, 622, 626 (6th Cir. 1998);
Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 59 F.3d 852, 864 (9th Cir. 1995); L.M. Everhart Constr., Inc. v.
Jefferson Cnty. Planning Comm’n, 2 F.3d 48, 51–52 (4th Cir. 1993); Nestor Colon Medina &
Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 1992).
73 See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1128 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding developer’s substantive
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rights are often implicated via a government action such as a taking,
they are also distinct constitutional grounds for individual relief.  For
example, in Elsmere Park Club Ltd. Partnership v. Town of Elsmere,74
a property owner whose building was condemned after a flood had his
substantive due process rights violated because his application asking
for a permit to repair the condition himself was purposefully delayed
by the town.  The court found this substantive due process violation
even though the condemnation itself was not considered a taking.75
2. The Takings Clause
Without going too far beyond the scope of this Article, the inter-
action between the Takings Clause of the Constitution76 and the abil-
ity of local governments to engage in regulatory takings is an essential
cornerstone of the legal understanding of land use.  A regulation such
as a planning decision may constitute a taking subject to the Constitu-
tion’s just compensation requirement.77  Applying the seminal test set
forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, a court
must weigh the “economic impact of the regulation”—particularly the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with the landowner’s
“distinct investment-backed expectations”—against the general “char-
acter” of the governmental action.78  In analyzing the “character” of
the regulation, the court will ask whether the regulation “can be char-
acterized as a physical invasion by government.”79  If so, the court will
be more likely to find a taking requiring the payment of just compen-
sation.80  Winning, as the landowner, on a regulatory takings claim is
quite difficult, however.81
3. Restrictions on Exclusionary Zoning
Land use decisions require a balance between local control, un-
derstood as a proper exercise of state and local police power, and the
due process rights were violated by municipality’s arbitrary decision to delay or deny issuing a
building permit), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists, 316 F.3d at 394.
74 Elsmere Park Club Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Elsmere, 771 F. Supp. 646, 651 (D. Del. 1991).
75 Town of Elsmere, 771 F. Supp. at 651.
76 U.S. CONST. amend V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”).
77 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127–28 (1978).
78 Id. at 124.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 The well-known Supreme Court case of Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
484–85 (2005), blesses the exercise of eminent domain pursuant to an “economic development”
plan.
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need to comport with the broad concepts of fairness mandated by the
U.S. Constitution.  Where zoning or land use decisions have an exclu-
sionary impact, courts may assess whether or not the exclusionary im-
pacts are a justifiable exercise of police power.82  However, it is not
common for land use decisions to be invalidated based on exclusion-
ary zoning.83  In order to be deemed unlawful, exclusionary zoning
must not serve legitimate purposes but rather be more akin to a
“thinly disguised desire to remain an exclusive community.”84
A Michigan case, English v. Augusta Township,85 offers an exam-
ple of the rare land use decision invalidated under an exclusionary
zoning theory.  Plaintiffs asked to have land rezoned from its agricul-
tural designation in order to allow for a mobile home park.86  The
township denied their request, because it had technically zoned other
land for the purposes of developing a mobile home park.87  However,
the land already designated for use as a mobile home park was located
in an area completely unsuitable for its development.88  Accordingly,
the court found that the township had “relegated” mobile homes to an
unusable part of town, and had therefore engaged in unconstitutional
exclusionary zoning.89
4. The Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act
Growth management and land use decisions must also comport
with the Equal Protection Clause90 and Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act, also known as the Fair Housing Act.91  While the Equal
Protection Clause requires a showing that a growth management plan
had a discriminatory intent (a difficult standard to meet), the Fair
82 See, e.g., Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1105–06
(5th Cir. 1996); Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (Pa. 1965).
83 See, e.g., Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal, 706 F.3d 1269, 1276–77 (10th Cir. 2013); City of
Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1106; Wincamp P’ship v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 458 F. Supp. 1009, 1027–28
(D. Md. 1978).
84 See KUSHNER, supra note 70, § 3:9 (discussing Kohn, 215 A.2d at 607–10). R
85 English v. Augusta Twp., 514 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
86 Id. at 173.
87 Id. at 174–76.
88 Id. at 173–74.
89 Id. at 174–76.
90 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
91 See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Tit. VIII, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 81–89.  Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is more commonly known as the Fair Housing Act, which is codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2012).
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Housing Act may invalidate a growth management law where a dis-
proportionate impact is made on a protected class.92
A landmark example, Mount Laurel, New Jersey, had its zoning
ordinances invalidated on Equal Protection Grounds in South Bur-
lington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel.93  The Mount
Laurel township, just ten miles from Philadelphia and adjacent to
Camden, New Jersey, had its population double from 2817 to 5249
during the 1940s, and then again from 5249 to 11,221 during the
1950s.94  The huge influx was due largely to people moving in from
nearby cities—particularly as the expansion of nearby highways en-
hanced access to Mount Laurel.95  Many of those persons moving to
the township in the early 1960s were African-American or Hispanic,
and were clearly perceived as unwanted “outsiders” by the existing
Mount Laurel residents.96
It was in this context that a 1964 zoning ordinance limiting den-
sity came under Equal Protection and Due Process scrutiny.97  The
ordinance required larger lot sizes for development and had the effect
of creating very few affordable housing options within the township.98
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that not only were there a lack
of options, but indeed there was also open “hostility” towards Mount
Laurel’s poor persons living in substandard conditions.99  The Court
determined that Mount Laurel had made it “physically and economi-
cally impossible” for low- or middle-income housing to be provided by
its land use decisions.100
Writing about the township’s economic tunnel vision, the court
offered:
This pattern of land use regulation has been adopted for the
same purpose in developing municipality after developing
municipality.  Almost every one acts solely in its own selfish
and parochial interest and in effect builds a wall around itself
to keep out those people or entities not adding favorably to
the tax base, despite the location of the municipality or the
demand for varied kinds of housing.101
92 See KUSHNER, supra note 70, §§ 3:26, 3:28. R
93 S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
94 Id. at 718.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 725.
98 Id. at 719.
99 Id. at 722.
100 Id. at 724.
101 Id. at 723.
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Mount Laurel’s zoning decisions were ultimately deemed invalid
as a violation of the due process and equal protection requirements of
the state constitution.102  Thus, the Mount Laurel decision stands as a
seminal case requiring municipalities to use their land use regulation
powers in a manner that will allow a realistic opportunity for low- and
middle-income individuals to find affordable housing.
II. GROWTH MANAGEMENT LAWS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
Sprawl and other unforeseen problems can be traced to failings in
our legal system.  In two key ways, the legal structures meant to help
ensure smart growth have actually contributed to the problem of
sprawl: first, through the legal system’s sanctioning—indeed, its en-
dorsement—of municipal zoning laws, and second, through states’
failures either to enact effective growth management legislation or to
interpret and apply their existing growth management legislation
consistently.
A. Sprawl Is Actually Caused in Large Part by the Nation’s Laws
At its core, some say, sprawl is caused by our nation’s pursuit of
the “American Dream.”  In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,103 U.S.
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas famously described the
ideal American neighborhood as a “quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted.”104  The Court went on to
hold that a proper role for government was to “lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people [to live].”105
The Belle Terre decision serves as a reminder that our sprawling
nation could not have come into being without the willing assistance
of its legal system.  The nation’s legal system has encouraged sprawl
through its approval of municipal zoning laws.106  Conventionally, the
history of municipal zoning begins with the Supreme Court’s decision
102 Id. at 724–25.  In reaching its decision under the New Jersey Constitution, the court
noted that New Jersey constitutional requirements “may be more demanding than those of the
federal Constitution.” See id.
103 Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
104 Id. at 9.
105 Id.
106 See Michael Lewyn, You Can Have It All: Less Sprawl and Property Rights Too, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2007) (explaining that “[z]oning, street design, and parking regula-
tions discourage landowners from placing housing within walking distance of shops and jobs,
force landowners to surround their buildings with parking lots, and mandate the construction of
streets and highways that are too wide to be crossed comfortably on foot”).
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in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,107 a Lochner-era decision
that first established the constitutionality of zoning.  In Euclid, the
Court held that the Village of Euclid was free to segregate residential
land uses from industrial land uses.108  The Village’s power to segre-
gate land uses derived from the state’s police power (delegated to the
municipality) and from the collective will of the majority (voicing its
desires through the municipality’s officials).109  The Village’s zoning
ordinance was held to be a proper use of the police power because it
protected public health110 and preserved the value of private prop-
erty.111  Under the ordinance, the Village’s residents could rest assured
that an undesirable industrial land use would not suddenly spring up
down the street, leading to negative health outcomes and precipitating
a massive decline in the value of the surrounding land.112
Nobody would debate that industrial land uses (read: factories)
and residential land uses (read: single family homes) ought to be seg-
regated.  The Court in Euclid, however, was not solely concerned with
the pollution and noise associated with factories and other industrial
land uses.113  Less obviously, but more insidiously, the Court was also
concerned with the sort of “human pollution” that the Justices seemed
to associate with high-density housing options such as apartments and
townhomes.114  By allowing municipalities to slate large areas of land
for low-density, residential development, Euclid ushered in the era of
107 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
108 Id. at 389–90 (“[The Village’s] governing authorities, presumably representing a major-
ity of its inhabitants and voicing their will, have determined, not that industrial development
shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course of such development shall proceed within defi-
nitely fixed lines.  If it be a proper exercise of the police power to relegate industrial establish-
ments to localities separated from residential sections, it is not easy to find a sufficient reason for
denying the power because the effect of its exercise is to [prevent injury] of the residential
public . . . .”).
109 Id.
110 A municipality should, for example, have some way to prevent a coal plant or a paper
mill from springing up in the middle of a residential neighborhood.
111 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389, 395.
112 Cf. GILLHAM, supra note 60, at 16 (“[Zoning controls] provide reasonable expectations R
for the continued value of a given piece of land and thereby create a relatively stable
marketplace.”).
113 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394.
114 See Ziegler, supra note 56, at 47–48 (“The holding established that homeowners might R
properly be protected by zoning from apartment dwellings and those who occupied them.  An
apartment house, the Court pointed out, might operate as ‘a mere parasite’ in the neighborhood
of detached homes—constructed to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surround-
ings and in the process depriving children of their play areas.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394)).
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sprawl.115  As Professor Ziegler has argued, Euclid “has operated
throughout the twentieth century largely to constitutionalize low-den-
sity restrictive zoning and related local governmental actions directed
at excluding less affluent housing from entire neighborhoods and sub-
urban communities.”116  In Ziegler’s view, such zoning is less a matter
of public health and more a matter of snobbery or “NIMBYism.”117
The argument that sprawl is bad has become a familiar one.  Per-
haps most commonly, sprawl is blamed for increased congestion on
our roadways.  We live in an automobile-centered society, and the
built landscape reflects that cultural choice.118  Over the past three de-
cades, American vehicle use has outpaced population growth by a fac-
tor of three.119  The interstate highway system—our “yellow brick
road to sprawl”120—has enabled the movement of people between the
city and far away suburban communities.  By one estimation, our na-
tion’s roadway system can lay claim to the “largest public works pro-
ject in world history.”121  As urban planner Oliver Gillham has
written, the “huge new freeways would become the trunk veins and
arteries of a rapidly spreading membrane of development, spilling
over state and regional boundaries and changing the face of the
United States forever.”122
Sprawling development generally necessitates the use of open
space that might otherwise be protected for future generations.123  Ac-
cording to one report, land in certain metropolitan areas is being con-
sumed for development at a rate almost three times faster than
population growth.124  By 2050, an additional 23 million acres of
forestland may be lost forever.125  Of course, America is a rather large
country.  According to one account, total urban and suburban land
115 Id.
116 Id. at 47.
117 Id. at 47 n.98.
118 See, e.g., id. at 31 (concluding that hypersprawl is “totally shaped and dominated by the
automobile”).
119 REID EWING ET AL., URBAN LAND INST., GROWING COOLER: THE EVIDENCE ON UR-
BAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2, 6 (2008), available at http://www.smartgrowth
america.org/documents/growingcoolerCH1.pdf (citing federal highway statistics and reporting
vehicle use in terms of vehicle miles traveled).
120 Ziegler, supra note 56, at 35. R
121 GILLHAM, supra note 60, at 36. R
122 See id.
123 See JONATHAN LEVINE, ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN TRANS-
PORTATION AND METROPOLITAN LAND-USE 1 (2006).
124 See Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 23, at 185. R
125 NADEJDA MISHKOVSKY ET AL., INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, PUTTING SMART
GROWTH TO WORK IN RURAL COMMUNITIES 4 (2010).
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use in the United States has consumed only 3.1% of the nation’s total
land supply.126  This, however, is a misleading statistic.  Of the nation’s
total supply of land, only a small percentage has the right geography
to support any meaningful population density.127  An even smaller
percentage of land can provide a desirable place to live.  The truth is
that suburban sprawl consumes land.
Sprawl has also been blamed for cultivating social isolation within
American communities.128  In sprawling suburban neighborhoods,
where the closest thing to a public square may be a strip mall on a
major street, residents may not feel a strong “sense of place.”129  This
sense of detachment can have real psychological costs.130  Professor
Ziegler has postulated that many Americans who live in sprawling
neighborhoods are disappointed that “The Way Things Actually Are”
is different from “The Way Things Ought to Be”:
Instead of pastoral vistas enhanced by attractive buildings
and awesomely efficient highways, we have sprawl that
makes a mockery of urban vitality and turns countryside into
clutter.  Instead of comfortable cities that run like clockwork,
we have cities that are scattered, clumsy, expensive, and in-
creasingly hard to enjoy or even use.  Instead of shining tow-
ers in a park, we have windowless discount stores in a
parking lot.131
B. The “Smart Growth” Movement as the Antidote to Sprawl
The antidote to sprawl is “smart growth”—whatever that means.
Depending on whom you ask, smart growth is either a panacea or a
126 Clint Bolick, Subverting the American Dream: Government Dictated “Smart Growth” Is
Unwise and Unconstitutional, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 859, 861 (2000).
127 Ruben N. Lubowski et al., Major Uses of Land in the United States, 2002, USDA ECON.
INFO. BULL., May 2006, at iv.
128 LEVINE, supra note 123, at 1 (“A stunted community life is the ostensible product of the R
lack of casual, face-to-face interactions in lively public spaces.”).
129 See Ziegler, supra note 56, at 40. R
130 See id. at 38 (acknowledging the “growing awareness that there may be significant psy-
chological, emotional and civic costs associated with the rootlessness of the suburbs and of our
hypersprawl lifestyle”); see also Philip Rucker, In Loughner’s Neighborhood, Times Have Been
Tough, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2011, at A5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2011/01/11/AR2011011107515.html (citing sprawl as a cause of the social isolation
that may have contributed to the attempted assassination of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords
on January 8, 2011, in Tucson, Arizona.  “Tucson is divided by boulevards stretching six or eight
lanes wide and extending 15 or more miles into the horizon.  The subdivisions here are often
separated by concrete walls.”  Although sprawl might contribute to social isolation, we believe it
is a stretch to connect it causally to the attempted murder of Gabrielle Giffords.).
131 See Ziegler, supra note 56, at 39. R
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meaningless euphemism.  When evaluating smart growth definitions,
it can be hard to cut through the salesman-like puffing of the propo-
nents and the derogatory rhetoric of the critics.  Too often, for exam-
ple, proponents define smart growth with tautologies like “[s]mart
[g]rowth is a way of encouraging development and revitalization that
makes the most sense for future livability.”132
Nonetheless, we can distill certain basic features of the smart
growth movement.  The term “smart growth” is shorthand for a range
of alternatives to traditional suburban development.133  Such alterna-
tives include transit villages, fully contained communities, mixed-use
infill projects, and many other high-density, ecologically minded,
transit-oriented designs.134  Through changes to municipal codes and
countywide comprehensive plans, and, more recently, through enact-
ment of statewide growth management acts, planners at all levels of
state government have begun to embrace these alternative designs.135
Despite their diversity, smart growth policies all share a common
goal—namely, to change the status quo (somehow).  We say somehow
because, if the question is “how will we live?” then smart growth’s
most consistent response has simply been: “differently.”136  Yet, de-
spite this intractable definitional problem, the basic principles of
smart growth are evident.  The fundamental idea is that development
should take place in the right place, at the right time, and using the
right methods.137  Thus, smart growth envisions spatial, temporal, and
technical restrictions on development.
First, smart growth ensures that development occurs in the “right
place” by encouraging or mandating high-density, mixed-use develop-
ment as close to the urban core as is practicable.138  Smart growth poli-
132 What’s Smart Growth?, WASHINGTON STATE COMMUNITY, TRADE & ECON. DEV.
GROWTH MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, http://smartgrowth.wa.gov/what_is.htm (last visited May 18,
2015).
133 See GILLHAM, supra note 60, at 153 (“[T]he term smart growth has become an umbrella R
concept endorsed by a range of diverse groups seeking a way to plan for continued growth.”).
134 See id. at 155.
135 See Edward J. Sullivan, Comprehensive Planning and Smart Growth, in TRENDS IN
LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z 177, 188 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001) (commenting that, “[u]nlike
other western industrialized countries, the United States lacks a coherent national comprehen-
sive planning policy”).
136 See Smart Growth Programs, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/pro
grams/smart-growth-program (last visited May 8, 2015).
137 See What’s Smart Growth?, supra note 132 (stating smart growth encourages attractive R
development “where it can happen best” while wisely using land and resources).
138 See Livable Communities 1, 3 (Wash. State Cmty., Trade & Econ. Dev. Growth Mgmt.
Program, Discussing Paper No. 10 of 12), available at http://smartgrowth.wa.gov/papers/index.
htm (noting “urban densities” as one measure of smart growth initiative).
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cies also encouraging “infill”—construction which makes use of
vacant and underused properties in already developed areas139—or
“brownfields” development, which is development on polluted or con-
taminated land.140  In Phoenix, one of the country’s largest and most
sprawling cities, tax incentives handed out by the state legislature
helped spawn a $900 million urban infill project known as CityS-
cape.141  The project, which resulted in construction of 1.8 million
square feet of high-rise office buildings, fashionable storefronts, and
designer restaurants,142 aimed to resuscitate a dying area of Phoenix
known as Patriot’s Square Park.143  A project like CityScape theoreti-
cally will reuse and recycle land that is already developed, but de-
cayed.  As such, it can occur with minimal investment of additional
infrastructure.
Second, smart growth ensures that development occurs at the
“right time” by forestalling development in a particular area until such
area has been connected with adequate transportation, water, sewer,
infrastructure, and schools.  For example, a city ordinance might pro-
hibit development of an outlying neighborhood until the city’s tax
base is large enough to fund an elementary school in the
neighborhood.
Finally, smart growth ensures that development relies on the
“right methods” by encouraging or mandating changes to building
codes.  For example, building codes may need to be updated to allow
developers to build housing units with shared walls.
139 See ANNA READ & CHRISTINE SHENOT, INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, GETTING
SMART ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 6–7 (2010).
140 See Brownfields and Land Revitalization, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.
epa.gov/brownfields/ (last updated May 5, 2015) (“Brownfields are real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”).
141 Jahna Berry, 250-Room Hotel on Rise at CityScape Site, AZCENTRAL.COM (June 9, 2009,
10:46 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/community/phoenix/articles/2009/06/09/20090609phx-city
scape0610.html.
142 CITY OF PHOENIX CMTY. & ECON. DEV. DEP’T, CITY OF PHOENIX EMPLOYMENT
CENTER PROFILE: DOWNTOWN PHOENIX (2012), available at https://www.phoenix.gov/econdev-
site/Documents/104755.pdf; About, CITYSCAPE PHOENIX, http://www.cityscapephoenix.com/
about/cityscape/ (last visited May 18, 2015).
143 See Development: CityScape Transforms Downtown Phoenix, RED DEV., http://
www.reddevelopment.com/properties/case-studies/development/ (last visited May 18, 2015).  As
described on the project’s official website, CityScape aims to be Phoenix’s “focal point for urban
living and community activity in a revitalized downtown.” CityScape: Phoenix, Arizona, PK AS-
SOCIATES LLC, http://pkastructural.com/files/projects/Cityscape/1_Commercial_CityScape.pdf
(last visited May 18, 2015).
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C. A Brief History of Smart Growth Legislation
As mentioned previously, thirteen states have enacted growth
management legislation in an effort to bring smart growth under re-
gional control.144  States have adopted differing methods to tackle
smart growth and land use decisions, although each approach has its
pitfalls.  A brief history and examination of these efforts is in order.
“Growth management” as a goal of state planning first appeared
as a term of art in 1975.145  Though the phrase originally conjured con-
notations of slowing or stopping development altogether,146 “growth
management” is more commonly used to define local and state gov-
ernments’ efforts to “influence the amount, type, location, design,
rate, or cost of private and public development in order to achieve
public interest goals.”147  The goals of smart growth movements typi-
cally include balancing business and development interests with envi-
ronmental concerns such as maintaining clean air and water, as well as
a high quality of life for residents.148
There were three key phases to the modern “smart growth”
movement.  The birth of the movement came in the 1960s and 1970s,
driven by environmentally concerned individuals in Hawaii, and then
later in Vermont, Florida, and Oregon, who together ushered in a
“quiet revolution in land use.”149  City planners began to promote the
idea of compact urban villages that utilized public transportation, bi-
cycling, and walking as an alternative to combat the increasing conges-
tion created by the rise of automobiles.150  The second phase involved
states such as Florida, Vermont, New Jersey, Maine, Rhode Island,
Georgia, and Washington, all of which enacted specific legislation that
focused on comprehensive planning in the decade leading up to
1991.151  Finally, political support increased and expanded to even
more states, with funding and gubernatorial support growing in states
such as Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Tennessee, and Colorado
in the years between 1992 and 2000.152 However, as this Article will
explore, political attitudes towards smart growth have been far from
consistent over time.
144 Supra note 25. R




149 Id. at 15, 18.
150 See id. at 13–15.
151 Id. at 15, 18.
152 Id. at 15.
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Although each state had its own political, social, and geographical
needs in enacting its smart growth legislation, most of these state-
based programs involved coordination of local land use planning ef-
forts through a “stick and carrot” package of obligations and incen-
tives.153  The means employed to meet the generally accepted goals of
using land sustainably and responsibly varied widely across different
states. For example, Oregon pioneered smart growth by establishing
urban growth boundaries beyond which development was highly dis-
favored in order to preserve its rural and agricultural land.154  Mary-
land adopted a different approach, by directing state grants to fund
infrastructure for “priority funding areas” rather than by designating
urban growth boundaries.155  Local planning has been voluntary in
Georgia and (until recently), mandatory in neighboring Florida.156
Washington State employs a decentralized, local-led growth manage-
ment program while Hawaii uses a top-down, centralized system.157
Which system is preferred by any given state has far more to do
with the interests of various parties—including political interests—
than many lawmakers are willing to admit.  For example, local govern-
ments may prefer a smart growth system that is incentive-based and
provides resources for projects of chief importance to the community,
while state authorities often prefer a centralized program that ensures
land use compliance even by reluctant localities.158  Ultimately, popu-
lar attitudes may have the greatest influence over what the elected
and appointed officials at each level of government decide to do with
their land use authority.  States with strong environmental conscious-
ness like Vermont or Oregon thus look quite different than states that
have stronger business and development pressures.
D. Various States’ Efforts at Growth Management Legislation—and
Their Pitfalls
Let us consider a few examples of smart growth management leg-
islation in depth in order to better understand their goals, and their
common problems that we must strive to avoid going forward.
153 Id. at 16.
154 Id. at 16–18. See generally PETER A. WALKER & PATRICK T. HURLEY, PLANNING PAR-
ADISE: POLITICS AND VISIONING OF LAND USE IN OREGON (2011).
155 Godschalk, supra note 25, at 17–18. R
156 Id. at 18.
157 Id.
158 Id.
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1. Washington: Too Many (Conflicting) Goals Create Lack of
Clarity
Washington State enjoys diverse terrains, from the Olympia Na-
tional Park and rain forest in the west, to the Cascade Mountain
Range, to the island chains scattered about Puget Sound, to the rolling
hills of Eastern Washington.159  Growth rates, particularly in the Puget
Sound region, had skyrocketed so much by 1990 that Washington leg-
islators took action by enacting the Growth Management Act
(“GMA”).160  The GMA converted a formerly relaxed approach to lo-
cal land use and planning into a decentralized but mandatory pro-
cess.161  Under the Washington GMA, local cities and counties are
responsible for developing their own comprehensive plans, subject to
review by one of the state’s Growth Management Hearing Boards.162
The Washington GMA vests most of the authority to make plan-
ning decisions at the local level.163  Counties that meet certain criteria
based on size and growth rate are required to comply with the GMA,
even if the county later falls out of those criteria.164  These rapid-
growth counties are required to create local plans under the GMA
and submit a countywide planning policy to their local governing bod-
159 See, e.g., Geology of Washington, WASHINGTON STATE DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
http://www.dnr.wa.gov/ResearchScience/Topics/GeologyofWashington/Pages/geolofwa.aspx (last
visited May 18, 2015).
160 See Growth Management Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2012) (effective July 1,
1990).  The constitutionality of the statute was challenged nine years later, when Mason County
unsuccessfully appealed the invalidation of its comprehensive plan. See Diehl v. Mason Cnty.,
972 P.2d 543 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).  Mason County argued, albeit halfheartedly, that the GMA
was unconstitutionally vague.  Though the statute is not specific in the direction it provides local
governments as to methodology, the Washington Court of Appeals held that the forms of review
and desired outcomes are clear from the law.  Mason County later brought an unsuccessful sepa-
ration of powers challenge to the quasi-judicial nature of the Growth Management Hearing
Boards, which was also denied by the Court of Appeals. Diehl, 972 P.2d at 551–52.
161 Compare Planning Enabling Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70 (West 2011), with
Growth Management Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A (2012).
162 See 24 TIMOTHY BUTLER & MATTHEW KING, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW & PRACTICE, § 18.3 (2d ed. 2007).
163 Id.
164 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.040(1) (2012).  Counties meeting the following criteria are
required to adopt comprehensive planning policies and comply with the GMA:
• A county with a population of 50,000 or more, and prior to May 16, 1995, exper-
iencing a population increase of more than ten percent in the previous ten years;
• A county with a population of more than 50,000 that, on or after May 16, 1995,
has had its population increase by more than seventeen percent in the previous ten
years; or
• A county, regardless of its current population, that has had a population increase
of more than twenty percent in the previous ten years.
Id.
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ies.165  The local authority must identify natural resources that need to
be protected, urban growth areas where appropriate infrastructure ex-
ists to encourage development, and compile an extensive, harmonious
growth plan to submit to the state Department of Community, Trade,
and Economic Development.166
A major flaw in Washington’s GMA, however, can be found in its
structure of thirteen internally conflicting goals.167  The statute lays
out these disparate goals without any guidance as to how local govern-
ments are to rank or prioritize them in creating their land use plans.168
Some of the goals clearly contradict one another.  For example, the
pro-development goals such as “encourage economic development”
and “protect private property rights,” frequently come into tension
with the environmentally-focused goals of “maintain and enhance nat-
ural resource industries,” “encourage the retention of open space,”
and “protect the environment.”169  There is also a goal that seeks to
“protect the rights of interested citizens” and one that focuses on cre-
ating affordable housing.170  What’s more, some of the language in the
statement of goals appears to be the product of patent political pan-
dering—for instance, the desire to “enhance the state’s high quality of
life.”171  In the end, there is no consistent, helpful guidance or insight
into the essential purpose of the GMA for the courts or interested
parties to rely on.
Not surprisingly then, the internally inconsistent goals of the
GMA have led to confusion and costly litigation.172  The natural con-
165 BUTLER & KING, supra note 162, § 18.5. R
166 Id. §§ 18.5, 18.17.
167 The statute lays out the following goals: (1) encourage urban growth in areas where
adequate public facilities already exist or where they can be provided in an efficient manner;
(2) reduce urban sprawl; (3) encourage efficient, coordinated transportation systems; (4) en-
courage the availability of affordable housing; (5) encourage economic development; (6) protect
private property rights; (7) process permits in a timely and fair manner, thereby encouraging
predictability; (8) maintain and enhance natural resource industries such as the timber, fishing,
and agricultural industries; (9) encourage the retention of open space, conservation of wildlife
habitat, and development of recreational opportunities; (10) protect the environment and en-
hance the state’s high quality of life, including quality of air and water; (11) encourage citizen
participation and community coordination in the planning process; (12) ensure public facilities
and services are adequate to serve the development; and (13) encourage preservation of historic
lands, sites, and structures. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020.
168 BUTLER & KING, supra note 162, § 18.2. R
169 See id.
170 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(4), (11).
171 WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020(10).
172 E.g., Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322 (Wash. 2005) (en banc); Town of Wood-
way v. Snohomish Cnty., 291 P.3d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 322 P.3d 1219 (Wash. 2014)
(en banc).
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flict between would-be developers seeking permission to move for-
ward with plans versus neighbors opposing their projects on
environmental grounds has required Washington courts to interpret
the GMA on numerous occasions.  Parties seeking opposite outcomes
each argue vociferously (and correctly) that they are merely doing
what is dictated by GMA.
One such conflict resolved by the state’s highest court pitted pri-
vate property rights against a developer in Viking Properties, Inc. v.
Holm.173  In Viking, the Washington Supreme Court refused to invali-
date a covenant restricting density in a small subdivision near Seattle
even though the developer argued he was required to build at greater
density to serve the GMA’s goal of reducing sprawl.174  The Court ex-
plained that it would not invalidate a restrictive covenant unless the
covenant was clearly “injurious to the public” or unless it found a
clear legislative directive to override the private restriction.175  The
Court found neither to be the case because the covenant actually fur-
thered another GMA goal: protecting private property rights.176  Al-
though Viking Properties argued that the GMA also established a
clear public policy against sprawl, the Court refused to elevate the
goal of higher density development above all other GMA goals.177  In
addition, the Court noted that the restrictive covenant had the addi-
tional meritorious effect of preserving open space in the neighbor-
hood affected by the covenant.178  Finally, the Viking Court opined
that the state legislature did not clearly direct courts to override pri-
vate property restrictions in favor of public policy.179  The GMA was
proscriptive in nature, and, therefore, the legislature never intended
to override contractual rights (e.g., private property density restric-
tions), even from “bygone eras.”180
173 Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).  Two of the authors of
this paper, Chryssa Deliganis and Steve Calandrillo, served as counsel to one of the defendants
in the Viking case.
174 Id. at 324–26.
175 Id. at 329.
176 Id. at 330.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 331.
180 Id. at 330.  The Viking Court also cited its decision in Mains Farm Homeowners Ass’n v.
Worthington, 854 P.2d 1072 (Wash. 1993) (en banc), in which it refused to allow an adult family
home on a property restricted by covenant to single family homes.  The court looked for explicit
indication from the legislature that it intended to override restrictive covenants when it provided
that adult family homes were to be considered “residential” for zoning purposes. Viking, 118 at
327.  An example of an explicit indication is found in WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.224 (2014),
which expressly outlawed racial restrictions in private property agreements.
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The conflicting goals allegedly served by Washington’s GMA led
again to bitter, ongoing litigation in the case of Town of Woodway v.
Snohomish County,181 mentioned briefly in the introduction to this
Article.182  The case offers a textbook illustration of the way in which
the GMA can be manipulated into opposing arguments to suit one’s
needs.183  Developer Blue Square sought permission to create a mas-
sive residential development, potentially up to eighteen stories tall, on
the scenic Point Wells property.184  Of course, it cited the GMA-sanc-
tioned goal of reducing sprawl and protecting private property rights.
Residents in neighboring Richmond Beach who would bear the nega-
tive externalities from a project of this magnitude understandably op-
posed the development because of its traffic and environmental
impacts.185  What was worse was that the developer received permis-
sion for this endeavor from the county it was situated in even though
nearly all of the environmental impact would fall upon Richmond
Beach to the south, a very old community which had no voice in the
planning process.186  The Washington Growth Management Hearing
Board found that Blue Square and Snohomish County had indeed
failed to comply with the GMA in planning this development, but the
developer appealed on the ground that his rights were “vested” by his
reliance on the initially approved permit.187  The Washington Supreme
In sum, the legal question in Viking came down to whether the GMA created bright line
rules or anti-sprawl policy making the covenant’s density restriction per se too low.  The Wash-
ington Supreme Court rejected the idea that the GMA in any way mandated certain density
levels. Id. at 331.  It said that “the growth management hearings boards do not have authority to
make ‘public policy’ even within the limited scope of their jurisdictions, let alone to make state-
wide public policy.” Id.
“[T]he existence of restrictive covenants that predate the enactment of the GMA and limit
density within the urban growth areas are the type of ‘local circumstances’ accommodated by the
GMA’s grant of a ‘broad range of discretion’ for local planning.” Id.  The GMA “does not
prescribe a single approach to growth management.” Id. at 329.  The GMA “acts exclusively
through local governments and is to be construed with the requisite flexibility to allow local
governments to accommodate local needs.” Id.
181 Town of Woodway v. Snohomish Cnty., 291 P.3d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 322
P.3d 1219 (Wash. 2014) (en banc).
182 See supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text. R
183 See Opening Brief of Appellant BSRE, Woodway, 291 P.3d 278 (Nos. 68048-0-I, 68049-
0-I), 2012 WL 601318.
184 See supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text. R
185 Response Brief of Respondent Town of Woodway at 47, Woodway, 291 P.3d 278 (Nos.
68048-0-I, 68049-0-I), 2012 WL 1122950, at *47.  For instance, the Point Wells development
would bring many thousands more car trips per day through a narrow two-lane road that ran
only through Richmond Beach. Id.
186 See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text. R
187 Woodway, 291 P.3d at 280–81.
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Court agreed with the developer despite the negative impacts and ex-
ternalities imposed on Richmond Beach.188
Ultimately, the Washington Growth Management Act does not
provide sufficient clarity or guidance to developers, property owners,
or conservationists to prevent complicated litigation.  Rather, it in-
spires exactly the opposite result.  Interest groups on both sides of
every land use debate can claim compliance with the GMA due to its
internally conflicting goals, while the only interests that are served are
those of the attorneys billing the hours to keep up the fight.
2. Florida: Something Is Better than Nothing at All
Florida faced a unique challenge when it drafted its growth man-
agement legislation—extremely rapid population growth.189  The state
gains a staggering three million residents each decade.190  The 2010
Census shows a growth rate of 17.6% for Florida (2.8 million people
more in 2010 than 2000).191  In the 1970s, as the population surged, the
geography of the state was unable to manage this growth without fac-
ing a water crisis.192  Put less gently, “[f]rom the end of World War II
until the mid to late 1970s, Florida sold itself on the cheap to anybody
with a dollar and a shovel.”193  Then, Governor Reubin Askew of
Florida took leadership and saw three critical pieces of planning legis-
lation enacted:194 (1) the Water Resources Act,195 (2) the Land Con-
servation Act (also known as the Land Management Act),196 and
(3) the Comprehensive Planning Act.197  These three laws created sig-
188 See Town of Woodway v. Snohomish Cnty., 322 P.3d 1219, 1221 (Wash. 2014) (en banc),
aff’g 291 P.3d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
189 See State Growth Management Summaries, VIRGINIA PRESERVATION.ORG, http://www.
vapreservation.org/growth/state.htm (last visited May 18, 2015) [hereinafter State Growth Man-
agement Summaries].
190 Laura C. Morel, Fla. Gets Growing, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at 1A (at the time
of the 2013 article, Florida’s population was approximately 18.8 million compared to New York’s
19.3 million).
191 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010 (2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf.  This was the third high-
est increase in sheer numbers but not the highest rate—Nevada grew by thirty-five percent in
those ten years. Id.
192 See Editorial, Finding Our Voices on Water Crises, OCALA STAR-BANNER, July 12, 2012,
available at http://www.ocala.com/article/20120712/OPINION01/120719916.
193 See Howard Troxler, Editorial, Florida Unwisely Repeals its Growth Laws, TAMPA BAY
TIMES, May 25, 2011, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/florida-
unwisely-repeals-its-growth-laws/1171755.
194 State Growth Management Summaries, supra note 189. R
195 Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws 1082.
196 Land Conservation Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws 1126.
197 Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, 1975 Fla. Laws 794.
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nificant structures for locally developed land use plans with state ad-
ministrative oversight.
The Water Resources Act of 1972 established broad power to
protect Florida’s waterways.  The law charged state and regional au-
thorities with protecting Florida’s water sources and declared the pro-
tection of such sources a priority of the state Legislature.198  The law
also created a Department of Environmental Protection charged with
overseeing the “conservation, protection, management, and control of
the waters of the state.”199  The department was authorized to conduct
research, surveys, and data collection regarding topography, flood
risks, and other geological information relevant to the use of water.200
Using this information, the Department of Environmental Protection
was then the arbiter of water use decisions—coordinating among local
water districts to implement the state water plan, as a constant moni-
tor of water quality.201
The Land Management Act authorized the governor (or state of-
ficials) to designate areas of “critical concern” for preservation, such
as those with significant historical, environmental, or archaeological
importance.202  Under the Land Management Act, the regional plan-
ning authority or even the governor and his or her cabinet could con-
duct special review of “Developments of Regional Impact”—
including, for example, larger projects such as airports, large housing
projects, or projects that crossed jurisdictional lines.203
The Comprehensive Planning Act required state agencies to pre-
pare strategic plans, which were combined to create a “State Compre-
hensive Plan.”204  Rather than the state providing specific parcels of
land for identified purposes, there were twenty-five goals listed and
over 360 “strategic policies” to be considered in forming a “compre-
hensive plan.”205
Under these growth management laws that Florida employed
prior to 2011, a state planning agency (the Department of Community
Affairs) reviewed local plans, while other state agencies could provide
input throughout the process.206  The state agency would compile its
198 See FLA. STAT. § 373.016(4)(a) (1972).
199 FLA. STAT. § 373.016(5) (1972).
200 See id. § 373.026(1)–(2).
201 See id. § 373.036.




206 Kathryn Barkett Rossmell, Note, From Tools to Toys—The Gutting of the Infamous
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objections, recommendations, and comments into an “ORC Report”
and send that to the local government implicated.207  The local govern-
ment could then modify its plan and resubmit it, and the state plan-
ning board had another chance to review.208  The growth management
legislation also gave affected citizens the right to be heard through a
petition if the state agency provided them notice that a plan or amend-
ment would likely be approved.209
In essence, the growth management structure in Florida prior to
2011 afforded its state government substantial opportunity to review
local plans, mediate disputes through administrative law judges, and
ensure that local plans were in compliance with general state goals.
Florida’s authority to engage in state review of local land use de-
cisions, however, was severely undercut in 2011 when the growth man-
agement legislation on the books was repealed and replaced with the
Community Planning Act in an effort to promote economic growth.210
The Community Planning Act stripped the state’s authority to man-
date local government compliance, making local adaptation of state
plans permissive rather than required.211  The repeal of prior growth
management legislation was a political priority for both Florida House
Speaker Dean Cannon and Governor Rick Scott, who campaigned on
pro-development platforms.212  At approximately the same time that
Florida repealed its prior growth management laws, it became more
difficult for citizens to issue challenges relating to developers gaining
water permits.213  A decision by the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida sums up the about-face that Florida has done when
it comes to centralized planning: “What . . . is clear is that the State of
Florida and the South Florida Water Management District
Primary Indicators: How the Florida Legislature Accidentally Encouraged Urban Sprawl . . .




210 Community Planning Act, 2011 Fla. Laws 1997 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
§ 163.3161 (2014)). See Mary Ellen Klas, Growth Laws Weakened, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May
7, 2011, at 1B.
211 See Community Planning Act, 2011 Fla. Laws 1997; see also Kacie A. Hohnadell, Note,
Community Planning Act: The End of Meaningful Growth Management in Florida, 42 STETSON
L. REV. 715, 728-29 (2013).
212 Klas, supra note 210. R
213 Id.
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(“SFWMD”), notwithstanding protests to the contrary, have not been
true stewards of protecting the Everglades in recent years.”214
The new law of the land in Florida, the Community Planning Act,
supersedes over thirty years of precedent and administrative memory
and creates a new method of land use planning and review.  The previ-
ously strong state authority is now whittled down to two forms of re-
view: “state coordinated review” and “expedited state review.”215
Where the previous growth management structure afforded state re-
viewing officials forty-five days to review a local land use plan, under
the current “state coordinated review” structure, they now have only
five.216  Moreover, where the state used to have thirteen “primary in-
dicators” to consider in determining whether a proposed land use plan
comported with the state comprehensive plan, the Community Plan-
ning Act creates eight factors217 to establish whether or not something
is considered “sprawl.”218  These eight factors are binding; if four of
214 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, No. 04-21448-CIV, 2011 WL
1624977, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2011).
215 Rossmell, supra note 206, at 222. R
216 Id. Additionally, under “expedited state review,” interested state agencies have thirty
days total to submit limited comments to local governments and the Department of Community
Planning regarding a proposed local land use plan. Id.
217 Id. at 220.  Under the Act, “[t]he future land use element or plan amendment shall be
determined to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl if it incorporates a development pat-
tern or urban form that achieves four or more” of the following eight factors:
[(1)] Directs or locates economic growth and associated land development to geo-
graphic areas of the community in a manner that does not have an adverse impact
on and protects natural resources and ecosystems.
[(2)] Promotes the efficient and cost-effective provision or extension of public in-
frastructure and services.
[(3)] Promotes walkable and connected communities and provides for compact de-
velopment and a mix of uses at densities and intensities that will support a range of
housing choices and a multimodal transportation system, including pedestrian, bicy-
cle, and transit, if available.
[(4)] Promotes conservation of water and energy.
[(5)] Preserves agricultural areas and activities, including silviculture, and dormant,
unique, and prime farmlands and soils.
[(6)] Preserves open space and natural lands and provides for public open space
and recreation needs.
[(7)] Creates a balance of land uses based upon demands of the residential popula-
tion for the nonresidential needs of an area.
[(8)] Provides uses, densities, and intensities of use and urban form that would re-
mediate an existing or planned development pattern in the vicinity that constitutes
sprawl or if it provides for an innovative development pattern such as transit-ori-
ented developments or new towns as defined in [section] 163.3164.
FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(b)(I)–(VIII) (2014).
218 Rossmell, supra note 206, at 224 (“The eight factors are clearly the most powerful part R
of the statute, and the guillotine that killed the thirteen primary indicators.”).
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them are considered met, then a local land use plan “shall be deter-
mined to discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl.”219  The fact
that these eight factors immediately follow the preexisting thirteen
“primary indicators” in the statute220 does not provide a clear resolu-
tion, and it is uncertain how courts will attempt to interpret and re-
solve these different and potentially conflicting criteria in the coming
years.221
3. Oregon: If It Ain’t Broke, Keep Enforcing It!
Oregon has long been considered a pioneer in land use law due to
its creation of “urban growth boundaries” (“UGBs”) as part of its
comprehensive land use planning laws adopted in 1973.222  The Ore-
gon Land Use Planning Program created both a citizen commission
with authority to oversee land use decisions, the Land Conservation
and Development Commission (“LCDC”), as well as a state Depart-
ment of Land Conservation and Development (“Department”) to im-
plement the program.223  The citizen LCDC appoints the director of
the Department.224  The express purpose of this land use legislation
was to “stop a process of cumulative public harm resulting from unco-
ordinated land use,”225 not unlike what a layman might refer to as the
“tragedy of the commons.”
Under the Oregon Land Use Planning Program, local govern-
ments submit land use plans subject to periodic review by the Depart-
ment and LCDC.226  However, extensive delays in the process led to
amendments in the growth management legislation in 1991.227  Now,
in addition to the prior structures, there exists a Land Use Board of
Appeals, comprised of three attorneys appointed by the state gover-
nor.228  Attempts to coordinate the review being conducted by the
state agencies, the LCDC, and Land Use Board of Appeals have
proven unsuccessful, particularly as the attorney general interpreted
case law to preclude certain state agencies from being required to par-
219 Id.; FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(b).
220 The thirteen indicators are listed in FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)(9)(a).
221 Rossmell, supra note 206, at 224, 228–29. R
222 See Robert L. Liberty, Oregon’s Comprehensive Growth Management Program: An Im-
plementation Review and Lessons for Other States, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,367,
10,368, 10,374 (1992).
223 Id. at 10,368.
224 Id. at 10,369.
225 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco Cnty. Ct., 703 P.2d 207, 212 (Or. 1985).
226 Liberty, supra note 222, at 10,372. R
227 An Act Relating to Land Use Periodic Review, 1991 Or. Laws 1148 (1991).
228 See Liberty, supra note 222, at 10,373. R
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ticipate in coordination efforts.229  Thus, even in what is arguably one
of the most progressive and environmentally conscious states in the
nation, coordination of various government actors (including citizens)
with regard to land use planning and review has proven elusive.
Oregon is nonetheless still deserves praise for offering a revolu-
tionary tool to land use legislators: namely, the creation of UGBs.
UGBs were created by 1974 legislation, as part of the state’s planning
goals, which are binding on local plans.230  Goal 14, entitled “urbaniza-
tion,” requires that every incorporated community draw a UGB based
on seven factors, including the need to accommodate long-term popu-
lation growth and environmental impacts.231  Drawing an appropriate
UGB, however, is a complicated and nuanced task, particularly if pop-
ulation growth does not follow expected projections.  Because Oregon
experienced population decline followed by rapid growth from the
1980s to the 1990s, some UGBs were drawn too broadly for the period
of population decline, while other cities added land to their UGBs to
accommodate perceived growth that never manifested.232
Goal 14 classifies land into three possible categories: urban,
urbanizable, and rural.233  Urban land exists within or adjacent to an
incorporated city, with emphasis on an already-existing high concen-
tration of people and supporting public facilities and infrastructure.234
Urbanizable land exists within a UGB and is considered necessary
and suitable for future urban uses, able to be served by existing infra-
structure, and necessary for the expansion of an urban area.235  Lastly,
rural lands are found outside a UGB, and are generally agricultural,
forest, or open spaces (though they are essentially everything that is
not urban or urbanizable).236  In general, residential and urban growth
229 Id. at 10,375; see also In re State Agency Coordination Program of the Dep’t of Reve-
nue, LCDC No. 91-CERT-707, at 3, 4, 7 (Jan. 10, 1991) (citing Attorney General Letter of Ad-
vice, No. OP-6390 (Oct. 11, 1990)).
230 See LCDC, OREGON’S STATEWIDE PLANNING GOALS 2, 10, 12 (1990).
231 Id. at 12–13.  The factors are as follows: “(1) Demonstrated need to accommodate long-
range urban population growth requirements consistent with LCDC goals; (2) Need for housing,
employment opportunities, and livability; (3) Orderly and economic provision for public facili-
ties and services; (4) Maximum efficiency of land uses within and on the fringe of the existing
urban area; (5) Environmental, energy, economic, and social consequences; (6) Retention of
agricultural land as defined, with Class I being the highest priority for retention and Class VI the
lowest priority; and (7) Compatibility of the proposed urban uses with nearby agricultural activi-
ties.” Id. at 12.
232 Liberty, supra note 222, at 10,376. R
233 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco Cnty. Ct., 703 P.2d 207, 214–15 (Or. 1985).
234 Id. at 215 (citing Statewide Planning Goal Definitions).
235 Id.
236 Id. at 214–15.
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(including incorporation of new cities) is not permitted outside a
UGB, though exceptions are authorized under Goal 2 of the
legislation.237
There are numerous examples of UGBs accomplishing precisely
what they were intended to do—i.e., the promotion of growth within
an urban boundary and the deterrence of sprawl outside of it in agri-
cultural or rural areas.  For instance, Washington County just outside
of Portland saw ninety-six percent of its residential growth permits
from 1984 to 1988 approved within its UGB and only four percent
approved for sites outside the UGB.238  Similarly, the Portland metro-
politan area saw ninety-five percent of residential units built within its
UGB during a five-year study.239  However, Bend, Oregon’s UGBs
were less astonishing in their success rates, as fifty-nine percent of new
residential units were built outside its UGBs and eighty-one percent of
industrial development permits were authorized inside its UGB, creat-
ing the opposite result of that intended.240
Whether or not a land use project may be approved depends on
whether or not it complies with Oregon’s legislative goals regarding
land use. For example, in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County
Court,241 an advocacy group opposed the incorporation of a medita-
tion center as a new city, Rajneeshpuram.  Whether incorporation of
the city was legal depended on (1) if incorporation constituted a “land
use decision” for the purposes of the state planning statute, (2) if Goal
14 prohibited this incorporation, and (3) whether Goals 3 (pertaining
to agricultural land) and 14 of the planning statute affected the incor-
poration decision.242  The Oregon Supreme Court held that the deci-
sion whether or not to allow Rajneeshpuram to incorporate was
indeed a land use decision and thus fell under the jurisdiction of the
Land Use Planning Act; that Goal 14 did not prohibit the incorpora-
tion of the new city; and that statewide goals pertaining to the devel-
opment of agricultural land were at issue in this decision.243
237 Id. at 215.
238 Liberty, supra note 222 at 10,377–78 (citing WASH. CNTY. DEP’T OF LAND USE & R
TRANSP., JOINT LEGIS. COMM. ON LAND USE, BRIEFING ON WASHINGTON COUNTY LAND USE
AND TRANSPORTATION ISSUES (1989)).
239 Id. at 10,378 (citing ECO NW. & D. NEWTON & ASSOC.,, PORTLAND CASE STUDY: UR-
BAN GROWTH MANAGEMENT STUDY (1990)).
240 Id. (citing ECO NW. & D. NEWTON & ASSOC., BEND CASE STUDY: URBAN GROWTH
MANAGEMENT STUDY 3 (1990)).
241 1000 Friends of Or. v. Wasco Cnty. Ct., 703 P.2d 207 (Or. 1985).
242 Id. at 213.
243 Id.
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Despite Oregon’s land use planning successes, its smart growth
legislation has faced opposition via statewide ballot measures attempt-
ing repeal.244  Part of its survival is attributed to former governor Tom
McCall, whose popularity continues to stimulate Oregon land use
preservation efforts.245  Not long before his death in 1983, McCall fa-
mously stated, “[i]f the legacy we helped give Oregon and which made
it twinkle from afar—if it goes, then I guess I wouldn’t want to live in
Oregon anyhow.”246  His heartfelt desire to create an enduring, re-
sponsible growth policy was crucial in defeating a ballot measure
aimed at repealing his signature land use legislation.247
Public sentiment did not remain on the side of state land use
planning advocates, however.  In 2000, Ballot Measure 7 was passed,
providing compensation to land owners whose “property values were
reduced by land use regulations.”248  This marked a substantial victory
for reclaiming and preserving private property rights in the face of
regional planning.249  The Oregon Supreme Court subsequently over-
turned Ballot Measure 7 in 2002 on a technicality.250 However, a sub-
sequent ballot initiative, Ballot Measure 37, was passed in 2004 and
accomplished in practice what Ballot Measure 7 aimed to do.251  Ballot
Measure 37 required state and local governments to either waive land
use planning regulations, or pay compensation for all the declines in
property values shown to result.252  In effect, disappointed developers
who desired to build in areas otherwise not permitted under the
state’s UGB structure could now demand compensation from the gov-
ernment if their permit was denied.  As claims for compensation
reached $19.8 billion (more than the state’s overall two-year budget)
in 2007, many state and government actors were forced to succumb to
244 See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 154, at 9 (occurring in years 1976, 1978, and 1982). R
The continuing work of the 1000 Friends watchdog group is largely attributable to Governor






250 Id. The ballot measure would have changed more than one part of Oregon’s constitu-
tion. See League of Or. Cities v. Oregon, 56 P.3d 892, 910–11 (Or. 2002) (invalidating Ballot
Measure 7 on grounds that it violated state procedural requirements for constitutional
amendments).
251 See WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 154, at 9. R
252 Id.
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the financial pressure and waive the land use regulations that had
been so widely praised for the prior three decades.253
In the end, even Oregon was not immune to the pressures that
plague land use planning—namely, the competing tensions between
private property rights, including those of developers implicating eco-
nomic growth, and the public interest in collaborative regional
planning.
4. Maryland: A Good Rule, If It Were Followed
Maryland is home to the lion’s share of the Chesapeake Bay—an
enormous waterway that affects the environment and economy of six
states.254  In addition to carrying the bulk of the bay-preservation bur-
den, Maryland is the fifth most densely populated state in the na-
tion.255  One estimate found that Maryland was slated to lose 240,000
acres of farmland and 307,000 acres of forest by the year 2020.256  Rec-
ognizing the need to be responsible stewards of their land, Maryland
lawmakers crafted innovative—indeed, award winning—growth man-
agement legislation.257  However, failure to consistently apply its
growth management legislation has left Maryland in nearly the same
place it started when it comes to development and sprawl.258
Maryland had laws as early as the 1970s designed to protect wet-
lands,259 water sources,260 forests,261 and farmland.262  Maryland then
joined the nationwide growth management legislation movement in
1992 with the passage of the Economic Growth, Resource Protection,
253 Id.
254 See Philip J. Tierney, Bold Promises but Baby Steps: Maryland’s Growth Policy to the
Year 2020, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 461, 461–64 (1994).
255 Id. at 464; DEPT. OF LEGIS. SERVS., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, UPDATE ON SMART
GROWTH AND PLANNING POLICY IN MARYLAND 1 (2009).
256 See Tierney, supra note 254, at 461–62. R
257 See Md. Dep’t of Planning, Smart Growth Planning Topics, MARYLAND.GOV http://
planning.maryland.gov/OurWork/smartGrowth.shtml (last visited May 21, 2015) (detailing key
pieces of “Smart Growth Legislation”); see also Rebecca Lewis et al., Managing Growth with
Priority Funding Areas: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Yet to Come, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 457,
457–72 (2009) (describing the “numerous awards” Maryland’s 1997 growth management legisla-
tion had won before even being implemented).
258 See Lewis et al., supra note 257, at 471–72. R
259 Natural Resources Article, ch. 4, sec. 1, tit. 9, 1973 Md. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 446, 1257
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 9-101–9-603 (LexisNexis 2013)).
260 Natural Resources Article, ch. 4, sec. 1, tit. 8, 1973 Md. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 446, 1017
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 8-1201–8-1301 (LexisNexis 2013)).
261 Natural Resources Article, ch. 4, sec. 1, tit. 5, 1973 Md. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 446, 765
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-101–5-1302 (LexisNexis 2013)).
262 Act Concerning the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, 1974 Md.
Laws 2179 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. §§ 2-501–2-519 (LexisNexis 2013)).
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and Planning Act, which articulated eight “visions” for land use.263
Like other states, Maryland delegated the creation of land use plans
to local governments, at least initially.264
Given the shared nature of state usage of the Chesapeake Bay,
Maryland partnered with neighboring states Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia, as well as the District of Columbia and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, to establish a “2020 Panel” to make land use plans
for the future.265  While this partnership marked a significant opportu-
nity for regional land use planning, the bills establishing a 2020 vision
were quickly defeated in the Maryland legislature, largely due to op-
position from property rights activists, developers, farmers, and finan-
cial organizations.266
Instead of a plan with sights set on 2020, Maryland enacted a
package of growth management laws in 1997, including the innovative
Smart Growth Areas Act, which established the new concept of “Pri-
ority Funding Areas” (“PFAs”).267  The creation of PFAs quickly gen-
erated national attention, and Maryland was credited with starting a
“third wave” in the land use revolution.268
PFAs were, in 1997, a Maryland novelty, though they resembled
other growth management policy tools such as urban growth bounda-
263 Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act of 1992, ch. 437, sec. 1, art.
66B, § 3.06(B), 1992 Md. Laws 2961, 2967–68 (repealed 2012).  The eight visions are:
(1) Development is concentrated in suitable areas.
(2) Sensitive areas are protected.
(3) In rural areas, growth is directed to existing population centers and resource
areas are protected.
(4) Stewardship of the Chesapeake Bay and the land is a universal ethic.
(5) Conservation of resources, including a reduction in resource consumption, is
practiced.
(6) To assure the achievement of items (1) through (5) of this section, economic
growth is encouraged and regulatory mechanisms are streamlined
(7) Adequate public facilities and infrastructure under the control of the county or
municipal corporation are available or planned in areas where growth is to occur.
(8) Funding mechanisms are addressed to achieve these Visions.
See Md. Dep’t of Planning, Smart Growth Legislation: 1992 Economic Growth, Resource Protec-
tion, and Planning Act, MARYLAND.GOV http://planning.maryland.gov/ourwork/1992planact.
shtml (last visited May 21, 2015).
264 Economic Growth, Resource Protection, and Planning Act of 1992, 1992 Md. Laws at
2963.
265 See Tierney, supra note 254, at 465. R
266 Id. at 468 (citing Howard Schneider, Views on Md. Growth Control Plan Range from
‘Threat’ to ‘Vision,’ WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1991, at D3; Roll, Growth Bill Draws Fire from Build-
ers, Farmers, MONTGOMERY J., Feb. 27, 1991, at A5).
267 Lewis et al., supra note 257, at 457. R
268 Id. at 457–58.
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ries (originated in Oregon), metropolitan urban service areas (used in
Minnesota), and enterprise zones (used by several states including
New Jersey).269  Priority Funding Areas are, as their name would sug-
gest, areas targeted for public investment and therefore designed to
encourage development.270  PFAs were created as a “more politically
acceptable alternative to urban growth boundaries,” in which local
and state governments would direct funding for roads, housing,
schools, and the infrastructure necessary to spur growth.271
Like urban growth boundaries, the intended purpose of PFAs
was to curb growth outside of certain urban areas.272  However, UGBs
make it legally difficult to develop outside of a boundary line, while
PFAs attempt to create the same outcome via financial incentives
rather than by prohibition.273  Analogously, urban service areas limit
the expansion of public services and infrastructures such as water and
roads, but do not legally limit the expansion of housing projects into
new areas.274  Lastly, enterprise zones are like PFAs in that they en-
courage development by lowering taxes and easing regulatory require-
ments—again, trying to encourage responsible growth outcomes by
using more “carrot” than “stick.”275
Though PFAs were highly regarded as a creative combination of
these preexisting policy instruments, they did not produce the out-
comes originally envisioned.276  In overseeing the growth management
laws, some counties allowed PFA boundaries to be drawn too gener-
ously so as to accommodate growth.277  Reporting and review of
spending as it pertained to PFAs was not done in a complete man-
ner.278  According to some commentators, the amount of funding allo-
cated for PFAs was inadequate to make a meaningful difference.279
While some progress was seen, including increased investment and de-
269 See id. at 458; About UEZ, N.J. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, http://
www.nj.gov/dca/affiliates/uez/about (last visited May 21, 2015); Urban Growth Boundary,
OREGONMETRO.GOV, http://www.oregonmetro.gov/urban-growth-boundary (view “History”
tab) (last visited May 21, 2015).
270 Lewis et al., supra note 257, at 458–59. R
271 Jerry Weitz, The Next Wave in Growth Management, 42/43 URB. LAW. 407, 413 (2011).
272 See Lewis et al., supra note 257, at 458. R
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 458–59.
276 See Weitz, supra note 271, at 413. R
277 Id.
278 Id.; see also Lewis et al., supra note 257, at 464, 471. R
279 See Weitz, supra note 271, at 413. R
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velopment of wastewater management systems within PFAs,280 the
outcomes left much to be desired.  Ultimately, the amount of growth
and development of low-density parcels (i.e., the amount of sprawl),
was not improved in the ten years following passage of the Smart
Growth Areas Act.281  In fact, some growth and development was ac-
tually increased outside of PFAs—precisely the opposite of what the
legislation sought to effectuate.282
Ultimately, though PFAs represent an innovative and politically
viable solution to urban sprawl and growth management problems,
their implementation was inconsistent and ineffective.  Too many local
actors worked around the intended purpose of the PFAs, drawing
boundary lines too broadly, and reporting funding too vaguely.  In the
end, Maryland’s approach provides an informative lesson for current
growth management efforts: good rules only work if they are
followed.
III. ASSESSING THE COMMON PROBLEMS IN GROWTH
MANAGEMENT
Many commentators have surveyed the growth management laws
of various states, but such efforts are usually conducted in order to
generate a list of options for future legislation.283  However, it may
prove more helpful to think beyond the list of statutory frameworks
already provided by other states’ attempts—particularly because con-
sistent success under any growth management plan remains elusive.
We therefore need to assess the common problems witnessed in
growth management efforts across the United States in order to learn
lessons for the future.
A. Political Motivations and Interest Group Pressures Lead to
Inconsistent Legislation
Decisions concerning land use implicate almost every other as-
pect of the political process.  Land use decisions affect the environ-
ment, the economy, businesses, private property rights, affordable
housing, and human health and well-being.284  It is not difficult to un-
280 See Lewis et al., supra note 257, at 458. R
281 Id. at 467–72, 473 (includes tables summarizing development in many Maryland
counties).
282 Id. at 467.
283 See, e.g., Godschalk, supra note 25; Rebecca Lewis & Gerrit-Jan Knaap, Institutional R
Structures for State Growth Management: An Examination of State Development Plans, 44 ST. &
LOC. GOV’T REV. 33, 34, 40–42 (2012).
284 See, e.g., Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 23, at 183, 190. R
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derstand that politicians would be wary of telling developers (who cre-
ate jobs and donate money) that they cannot develop.  And it is also
easy to understand that it would be unwise to tell one’s constituents
that a large company was on the verge of moving in to their backyards
in order to build thousands of condominiums.  Eventually though, ex-
cessive political emphasis on economic development (while simultane-
ously assuring private property owners the right to continue to use
their land as they please) will lead to significant problems including
sprawl.  This is the basic tragedy-of-the-commons problem—there is
not enough land for everyone to have what they want, and too much
growth without preservation and conservation could be irrevocably
damaging to the environment.  Competing political interests around
land use run rampant.285
The hot-button nature of land use planning is evident from the
continuing fight over smart growth legislation, even decades after its
initial passage in some states.286  Legislators, judges, state actors, and
even the public have eventually buckled to the ever-changing (and
forceful) pressures coming from various sides of the issue.  Without
consistency over time, legislation swings back and forth, and long-run
solutions to land use dilemmas prove elusive.287
This lack of consistency can be traced directly to lawmakers’ dis-
comfort with antagonizing large groups of citizens in the short-term in
order to seek long-run goals.  In land use legislation, this often takes
the form of legislators’ desire to be seen as “pro-business” and in
favor of economic development—meaning there is often strong sup-
port for legislation that is friendly to developers (because of its imme-
diate impact) without rigorous consideration of long-term regional
planning or other delayed external effects.288  After all, those latter
interests are usually significantly less obvious and certainly less
organized.
The reluctance of legislators to take bold and consistent stands in
land use planning is perhaps best illustrated by the failure of the Ma-
ryland legislature to pass the 2020 vision despite the immense regional
buy-in that the plan had generated.289  Language in the Washington
state GMA is also strong evidence of legislators’ attempts to please all
285 See Manan M. Yajnik, Comment, Challenges to “Smart Growth”: State Legislative Ap-
proaches to Comprehensive Growth Planning and the Local Government Issue, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 229, 250.
286 See, e.g., Troxler, supra note 193. R
287 See, e.g., Klas, supra note 210. R
288 See, e.g., Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 23, at 186. R
289 See supra Part II.D.4.
\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-3\GWN301.txt unknown Seq: 41 18-JUN-15 11:18
2015] MAKING “SMART GROWTH” SMARTER 869
the people all of the time, particularly its internally conflicting goal
statement and the unnecessary portion about maintaining “the state’s
high quality of life.”290  And perhaps more than any other example,
Florida’s recent repeal of its growth management legislation after
three decades of state land use coordination, in an effort to promote
“economic development,” represents the ultimate power of the dollar
and a defeat for consistent smart growth over time.291
B. Inconsistent Application by Courts
Not only have states demonstrated that it is difficult to keep
smart growth management legislation on the books,292 but it has also
proven challenging for courts to apply these laws in a manner that is
predictable and consistent.  A Florida decision, Board of County
Commissioners v. Snyder,293 which pre-dated the repeal of Florida’s
growth management law, is a prime example.  By 1993, when the Sny-
der case was decided, there were wide inconsistencies as to the way
rezoning determinations were reviewed—namely, whether they were
to be considered judicial or quasi-judicial.294  In Snyder, the standard
of review for the Florida Supreme Court was contingent upon a deter-
mination as to whether the action of the zoning board was considered
judicial or quasi-judicial.295  However, rather than making one of those
two decisions, the Snyder court essentially created a third form of re-
zoning review: direct petition to the circuit court.296  This created con-
siderable confusion in the lower courts about how to apply the
decision.  Commentator Mary Dawson describes the morass:
For example, if a government made a compromise decision
to allow more intense development on a property . . . the
property owner, third-party intervenors, and the involved
state agencies could challenge the decision.  Until a court
rules on whether the decision is legislative or quasi-judicial,
the property owner must seek constitutional relief, injunctive
relief and review by writ of certiorari.  Regardless, the state
agencies and intervenors would challenge consistency
through the administrative process.  The property owner or
290 See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.020 (2015).
291 See supra Part II.D.2.
292 See supra Part III.A.
293 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
294 See Paul R. Gougelman III, The Death of Zoning as We Know It, 67 FLA. B.J. 25, 29
(1993).
295 Id. at 26.
296 See Mary Dawson, The Best Laid Plans: The Rise and Fall of Growth Management in
Florida, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 325, 343 (1996).
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the third party could also seek actual damages in circuit
court, but only the third party could seek injunctive relief in
the circuit court, if a development order is involved.297
The Snyder decision thus made it unclear how zoning decisions
were to move forward and be appealed in the future, and represented
a dramatic judicial undercutting of Florida’s growth management
structure.
In addition, the Washington state cases of Viking and Town of
Woodway illustrate the difficulty courts have had consistently apply-
ing growth management laws even absent the judicial tinkering that
occurred in Snyder.298  Where legislation points in as many different
directions as the Washington GMA does, it becomes difficult to pre-
dict how court decisions will come out.  In turn, this uncertainty de-
creases confidence in the law, inevitably leads to conflicting judicial
opinions, and undermines predictability for all parties involved.299
C. Gubernatorial Leadership Is Temporary
The work of Governors McCall in Oregon and Governor Askew
in Florida is illustrative of the profound impact that political leaders
can have.  Although the effective leadership of these governors was
integral to the passage of each state’s land use legislation,300 it is clear
that legislation needs to be passed with a longer shelf life than the
governorship.  Unfortunately, the hard work of both governors has
been undercut by later ballot measures (e.g., Ballot Measure 37 in Or-
egon),301 or by the near total repeal of the state-coordinated smart
growth legislation passed in Florida.302  Strong gubernatorial leader-
ship is essential to the creation of these laws, but political leaders must
be cognizant of the need to structure the legislation with long-term
sustainability in mind.
297 Id. at 344 (citing a 1995 interview with Richard Grosso, Legal Director for 1000 Friends
of Florida).
298 See supra notes 173–88 and accompanying text. R
299 Both the Viking and Town of Woodway cases have a tortured legal history, lasting years
and involving numerous reversals and conflicting decisions at various levels of the court system.
See supra Part II.D.1.
300 See supra Part II.D.2; see also supra Part II.D.3.
301 See supra Part II.D.3; see also Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Measure 37 and a
Spoonful of Kelo: A Recipe for Property Rights Activists at the Ballot Box, 38 URB. LAW. 1065,
1065–66 (2006).
302 See Klas, supra note 210. R
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D. Political Motivations by State Agencies
Independent state agencies also have not been immune from po-
litical influences.  For example, the lack of review or reporting by the
Maryland agencies responsible for overseeing Priority Funding Areas
is a strong indication that even state agency actors—who, one would
think, would be shielded from the political pressures of elected of-
fice—have failed to be reliable stewards of the growth management
tools in their states.303  Though Priority Funding Areas were the law of
the land, the state officials involved did not meaningfully fund or re-
cord what was occurring in the decisionmaking process.304  As a result,
residential development (and indeed, even funding) was just as likely
to occur outside a Priority Funding Area as inside one—and in some
places even less so.305
E. Popular Sentiment May Change
To solely blame government actors for the inconsistencies and
failings in state growth management laws, however, would be mis-
guided.  The key development that led to the undercutting of Ore-
gon’s renowned Urban Growth Boundaries was a citizen-driven ballot
measure.306  Even in what was an extremely environmentally con-
scious state—indeed Oregon is a leader in the environmental move-
ment—developer’s dollars and declining property values in some
areas were eventually able to sway a popular vote measure that led to
slackened enforcement of the UGBs and eviscerated the state land
use planning program.307
F. The “NIMBY” Phenomenon
The “Not In My Backyard” or “NIMBY” phenomenon is another
important factor in eroding support for smart growth efforts.  Previ-
ously supportive citizens suddenly withdraw their backing as soon as
they realize that the growth might actually occur in their own backy-
ards.  As Clint Bolick put it, “once people move to the suburbs . . .
they eagerly roll up the welcome mat.”308  The NIMBY attitude is un-
303 See supra Part II.D.4.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 See supra Part II.D.3.
307 See supra notes 244–53 and accompanying text. R
308 Bolick, supra note 126, at 863. R
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derstandable.  In fact, NIMBYs often “think of themselves as heroes,
not villains” for fighting development.309
One of the great ironies in the debate over sprawl is that liberal
environmentalists—the constituency most likely to support smart
growth legislation—is also a constituency that is filled with NIMBYs.
“After all,” observed one writer, “it is one thing to be a passionate
proponent of recycling, and another to welcome a particular recycling
plant—with the attendant garbage-truck traffic—on your street.”310
If the NIMBY dilemma is pervasive, and all available data sug-
gest that it is,311 what are the implications for smart growth?  One pos-
sibility is that the NIMBY problem will eventually spell the demise of
any smart growth program that attempts to increase density through
an urban growth boundary.  Those living inside the UGB will not
want outsiders coming in.  But where will the outsiders go?  That is
the unsolvable question.
Let us consider a representative example. Virginia’s Loudoun
County has been described above as a region that is well-situated to
take on additional growth.312  Its proximity to the nation’s capital
makes it a highly desirable place to live.313  Indeed, 2010 census data
show that Loudoun County grew by 84.1% in the past decade, far
outpacing growth in all other Virginian counties.314  The influx of new
homes, cars, and people rankled more than a few existing residents.315
The mayor of Leesburg, a town in Loudoun County, was quoted in the
local newspaper as saying that her town “has grown too fast.”316  The
mayor claims to have voted against every major residential rezoning
during her tenure on the Town Council.317
309 Edward Glaeser, How Skyscrapers Can Save the City, ATLANTIC, Mar. 2011, at 40, 50.
310 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Not in My (Liberal) Backyard, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at
WK 3.
311 Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 497–502
(1994) (detailing the variety of projects and techniques NIMBY organizers target and utilize).
312 See Joel Kotkin, America’s Fastest-Growing Counties: The ‘Burbs Are Back, FORBES
(Sept. 26, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2013/09/26/americas-fastest-
growing-counties-the-burbs-are-back/.
313 Id.
314 Crystal Owens, UPDATE: Loudoun Fastest Growing County in Virginia, LOUDOUN




317 Id.  For perspective’s sake, we should note that the other members of the town council
have supported increased density. Id.
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The mayor of Leesburg is not the only individual fighting new
development in Loudoun County.  A citizens’ network calling itself
the “Campaign for Loudoun’s Future” also has denounced new resi-
dential construction.318  “For several decades, Loudoun County has
been the target of national developers and their proposals for massive
increases in residential development beyond what our roads, schools
and other community services can handle,” the group’s website
warns.319  “Thousands of us fought back, seeking a say in the future of
our home and the way it is planned.”320  The website includes a picture
of a little girl holding a sign displaying the group’s slogan: “Don’t
Supersize Loudoun!”321
Yet, while Loudoun residents praise themselves for growing
responsibly and maintaining the “charm and small-town feel” of com-
munities such as Leesburg,322 outsiders look at Loudoun with con-
tempt.  As mentioned above, residents of commuter neighborhoods as
far away as West Virginia must drive through miles of untouched land
on their hour-long commutes into metropolitan Washington, D.C.323
As one West Virginian county planner explained, Loudoun County’s
restrictive land use regulations may have saved Loudoun from the
worst effects of sprawl—but, as a result, sprawl simply leapfrogged
Loudoun and ended up in West Virginia.324  “They’ve only accelerated
it,” said the planner, speaking about the leapfrogging phenomenon.325
“They’ve pushed it out here.”326
Professor Jonathan Levine’s 2001 survey cataloguing developer
perceptions of the land use market provides evidence of the NIMBY
problem’s severity.327  Although developers believed that restrictive
zoning regulations posed the greatest barrier to the expansion of
smart growth, they also saw “neighborhood opposition” as a major
318 See A Platform for Loudoun’s Future, CAMPAIGN FOR LOUDOUN’S FUTURE, http://




322 Owens, supra note 314. R
323 See Peter Whoriskey, Washington’s Road to Outward Growth, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
2004, at A1.
324 See id.
325 Id. at A9.
326 Id.
327 See Jonathan Levine & Aseem Inam, The Market for Transportation-Land Use Integra-
tion: Do Developers Want Smarter Growth than Regulations Allow?, 31 TRANSPORTATION 409,
417–19 (2004).
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impediment.328  When neighbors oppose smart growth developments,
they tend to do so by asking local planners to reject or modify the
project.329  Thus, at a conceptual level, it may be hard to distinguish
between the “regulatory” problem and the NIMBY problem.  They
are frequently two sides of the same coin.  However, neighborhood
opposition to smart growth poses a fundamentally different problem
from regulatory opposition. Neighborhood opposition is an older,
more pervasive, and more intractable problem.330
G. Constitutional Takings Jurisprudence
An aggressive program of smart growth will likely provoke a
backlash, not only from NIMBY citizens, but also from frustrated de-
velopers who may claim that the legislation or regulation (or land use
planning decision) amounts to a taking of their property deserving of
just compensation under the Constitution.  Under the Supreme
Court’s Penn Central test,331 a court must weigh the “economic impact
of the regulation”—particularly the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with the landowner’s “distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions”—against the general “character” of the governmental action.332
In analyzing the “character” of the regulation, the court will ask
whether the regulation “can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government.”333  If so, then the court will be more likely to find a
taking.334
One study of regulatory takings claims in nine southeastern states
suggests a relationship between the aggressiveness of a state’s smart
growth agenda and the number of regulatory takings claims that re-
sulted in published opinions.335  For example, Chris Williams’s study
found that a comparatively “overwhelming number of regulatory tak-
ings cases were brought by developers in Florida.”336  The author at-
tributed the result in part to the fact that Florida was the only state
out of the nine studied that had a comprehensive, statewide growth
328 Id.
329 Id. at 419.
330 Id.
331 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
332 Id. at 124.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Chris J. Williams, Do Smart Growth Policies Invite Regulatory Takings Challenges? A
Survey of Smart Growth and Regulatory Takings in the Southeastern United States, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 895, 910–13 (2004).
336 Id. at 912.
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management law on its books.337  He concluded that “the interests of
developers will likely be best served by avoiding the mandatory,
highly-restrictive forms of smart growth regulation that include urban
growth boundaries and development moratoria and choosing regula-
tions that create incentives for the kind of development that will meet
the goals of smart growth and avoid sprawl.”338
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SOLUTIONS: MAKING SMART
GROWTH SMARTER
In many ways then, “smart growth” has failed to live up to the
hype.  As detailed above, smart growth has been stymied both by un-
intended consequences and unforeseen circumstances, sometimes pro-
ducing counterproductive results.  In Maryland, the critically
acclaimed smart growth program seems to have frozen growth in the
very areas it was trying to encourage.339  Opponents of smart growth
also claim in numerous studies that smart growth legislation inevitably
results in higher housing prices by restricting the supply of land.340
In other situations, smart growth policies have collided headlong
with preexisting private property rights.  In Viking, for example, a de-
veloper attempted to exploit a state policy preference for higher den-
sity as a pretext for invalidating a private covenant that called for
lower density.341  This conflict has been described by Jonathan Levine
as a “mismatch between fealty to property rights and deference to
municipal regulations impinging on those rights.”342
Other times, consequences are unanticipated because few envi-
sioned the degree to which lack of political will would hamstring pro-
gress.343  The smart growth movement even has the potential to divide
environmentalists, with smart growth proponents struggling to shake
off accusations of NIMBY attitudes.344
Finally, growth management advocates may have underestimated
NIMBY opposition from current residents.  Such “opposition can take
337 Id.
338 Id. at 913.
339 See supra Part II.D.4.
340 See Wendell Cox, The Costs of Smart Growth Revisited: A 40 Year Perspective, NEW
GEOGRAPHY (July 8, 2011), http://www.newgeography.com/content/002324-the-costs-smart-
growth-revisited-a-40-year-perspective (reviewing studies).
341 See Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322, 329 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
342 LEVINE, supra note 123, at 89. R
343 See Yajnik, supra note 285, at 255 (“A legislature that defers excessively to local govern- R
ments could result in an inconsistent statewide land-use policy.”).
344 See Zusha Elinson, Smart-Growth Policy Splits Environmentalists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2010, at A21B; see also Rosenthal, supra note 310. R
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the form of political pressure, for example, city residents voicing their
concerns at planning commission meetings, or, in many states, through
direct democracy, such as referenda and initiatives.”345
Given this grim portrait of the fate of smart growth efforts, what
lessons can we glean and what solutions can we offer to the next wave
of land use legislators?
A. Remove Smart Growth from Local Politics: National Land Use
Planning
Removing land use decisions from political pressure seems a
nearly impossible feat, but it must be done. After all, the states sur-
veyed in this Article have employed almost every possible govern-
ment actor to perform its land use governance—from appointed state
agencies, to governor-appointed review boards, to citizen commis-
sions, to judges, to the state legislatures, to popular vote ballot
measures.
Shifting government control over certain critical land use deci-
sions from the local to the federal level would not be an unprece-
dented solution to this dilemma.  Congress has already enacted
federal legislation with strong implications on local land use, including
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,346 the Endangered Species
Act,347 and the National Environmental Policy Act.348  Even the birth
of the U.S. National Parks and National Forests represents a heavy
exertion of federal control over land.  These efforts required that vast
tracts of property be set aside for public use and long-term conserva-
tion, rather than for the kind of economic development at issue in
many of the lawsuits mentioned in this Article (e.g., housing develop-
ments or shopping centers).349  Those lawmakers fearful of public
backlash for curbing development in the name of conservation should
be encouraged by the astronomically high approval ratings given by
the public for the creation and maintenance of national parks.350
345 Winter King, Smart Growth Meets the Neighbors, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1349, 1355–56
(2007) (reviewing LEVINE, supra note 123). R
346 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
347 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
348 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012).
349 See, e.g., Town of Woodway v. Snohomish Cnty., 322 P.3d 1219 (Wash. 2014) (en banc),
aff’g 291 P.3d 278 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 118 P.3d 322, 329 (Wash.
2005) (en banc).
350 A nonpartisan poll found that ninety-five percent of likely voters “cherished” national
parks and “want the federal government to ensure they are protected.”  Press Release, Nat’l
Parks Conservation Ass’n, New Poll of Likely Voters Finds Unity in Public Support for National
Parks (Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.npca.org/news/media-center/press-releases/2012/
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Similarly, Congress could refocus long-stalled efforts on formu-
lating and promulgating a National Land Use Planning Act.  Rather
than vesting politically sensitive land use decisions with local and re-
gional bodies that can easily fall prey to the forces of public sentiment,
reviving the national movement seems like a better long-run alterna-
tive.  Given the shortcomings of state-based planning, a broader re-
gional and even a national structure may be able to ensure greater
consistency across the states currently engaging in land use planning,
and jump start the majority of states that still lack growth manage-
ment laws.
Indeed, in the 1970s, efforts to enact a National Land Use Plan-
ning Act came within a few votes of success.351  The law, as proposed
by Senator Henry M. Jackson, would have made federal grants availa-
ble for states that adopted strong regional land use plans.352  Rather
than risk the political minefield of seeking direct federal involvement
in formulating land use decisions, Senator Jackson’s bill would have
instead offered strong incentives for local leadership and authority to
enact and enforce growth management laws.353
This federal scheme is not unlike other incentive-based ap-
proaches that utilize Congress’s power of the purse such as those at
issue in South Dakota v. Dole.354  Time and time again, states have
demonstrated a willingness to comply with federal schemes when
there are significant grant dollars in play.355
poll_parks_support_080712.html.  A June 2013 Gallup poll showed sixty-eight percent of partici-
pants indicated they were “satisfied” with the job the federal government is doing on national
parks, an approval rating second only to “responding to national disasters” on a list of nineteen
prompts.  Jeffrey M. Jones & Steve Ander, Americans Praise Government Work on Natural Di-
sasters, Parks, GALLUP (July 12, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163487/americans-praise-gov-
work-natural-disasters-parks.aspx.
351 See Fred Bosselman, The Twilight of National Land Use Policy, 45 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 237, 237 (2012).
352 Id. at 242.
353 Id.
354 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal
statute that withheld funding from states who refused to raise the legal drinking age to twenty-
one).
355 See generally Glen Elsasser, Over-21 Liquor Law Upheld, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 1987, at 5
(at the time of the Dole decision, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia had already set
twenty-one as the minimum drinking age); see also American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
An analogy could be drawn to President Obama’s education initiative, Race to the Top.
The federal program offers financial carrots to states that enact certain education reforms, such
as data-based performance reviews to improve teacher quality and increased student access to
more “rigorous” learning opportunities. See Setting the Pace: Expanding Opportunity for
America’s Students Under Race to the Top, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
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The federal government could, therefore, implement reform in
two ways: (1) create a national scheme involving strong financial in-
centives for state and regional land use planning, and/or (2) set aside
land for the public benefit by exercising federal eminent domain
powers.
Monetary incentives may be particularly effective in spurring
neighboring states to create regional plans addressing broader land
use issues they face (witness, for example, the efforts to protect the
Chesapeake Bay across Maryland, Pennsylvania and Delaware).356  A
similar collaborative effort may be necessary in the American South-
west where the drying Colorado River has affected numerous commu-
nities across jurisdictional lines.357
If a federal stick-and-carrot approach to incentivizing strong
planning programs is less favored or proves unsuccessful, the govern-
ment could also rely on its eminent domain powers to set aside land
for park space, conservation, or affordable housing.  If political buy-in
resembled that of the U.S. National Parks, and land were used strate-
gically to meet actual needs (rather than to appease special interests),
this effort could have a dramatic impact on the way that land use plan-
ning is conducted far into the future.  First, with the federal govern-
ment taking the lead, long-term land use planning decisions would not
fall prey to the unique pressures felt by local leadership (and local
leaders could point to the federal government as a convenient scape-
goat).  Second, if communities truly saw the benefit to broad-scale
public land uses in a way that we today view our National Parks move-
ment, it could trigger a fundamental shift in perspective from our cur-
rent attitude towards private property rights.  Put differently, if more
people saw practical and positive outcomes associated with the public
use of land, they would be far more willing to forego certain private
property rights in order to make better, more community-focused de-
cisions concerning land use going forward.
default/files/docs/settingthepacerttreport_3-2414_b.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015).  Indeed, de-
spite initial resistance based on the notion that education, like land use, should be a local con-
cern, forty-one out of fifty-one state educational agencies (including Washington, DC) filed
applications for Phase 1 of Race to the Top. See States’ Applications, Scores and Comments for
Phase 1, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase1-applications/
index.html (last visited May 16, 2015).
356 See Tierney, supra note 254, at 465. R
357 Populations in seven U.S. states as well as Mexico have historically depended upon the
Colorado River as a source of water. See Sarah Zielinski, Running Dry, SMITHSONIAN, Oct.
2010, at 70, 71.
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B. Create Urban Growth Boundaries or Priority Funding Areas,
but for Keeps
Two of the more successful tools employed by the states surveyed
for this Article appeared to be the (1) urban growth boundary (in Or-
egon)358 and (2) the priority funding area (in Maryland).359  However,
both of the key efforts to use these tools faltered somewhere within
the political system.  The success of UGBs in curbing development in
open areas was quite promising before financial pressures and budget-
ary pitfalls made continuation impossible.360  If the smart growth
movement is going to remain stuck on a state-based system, then a
much more stringent, consistent, and robust application of UGBs or
PFAs would appear to be a useful approach.
It is an obvious goal of an effective smart growth scheme that it
be enforced in a way that is meaningful (read: has some teeth) and
consistent (read: does not disappear with changing political senti-
ment).  This is especially true of the UGB or PFA provisions that
showed such promise before changing political tides or lax implemen-
tation spelled their doom.  Meaningful enforcement and application of
these planning mechanisms could be provided through federal over-
sight and a strong incentive-based approach, as discussed above.361
Alternatively, lawmakers could devise a scheme that is more
“stick” than “carrot,” and look harshly upon the approval of new
building permits or projects outside of UGBs or PFAs.362  Along with
enforcement practices to ensure that new construction occurs only
with a valid permit, a strict policy of denying permits in areas where
growth is not intended could be highly successful.  Without govern-
ment support, large residential and commercial developments are
bound to be unsuccessful—either due to a lack of permitting or lack of
infrastructure.  Where private parties resisted (i.e., sought develop-
ment outside sanctioned UGBs or PFAs), government officials could
seek penalties or ultimately engage in a taking of the land, though of
358 See supra Part II.D.3.
359 See supra Part II.D.4.
360 WALKER & HURLEY, supra note 154, at 8–9. R
361 See supra Part IV.A.
362 To reiterate, the approval rating of such projects as national parks is unbelievably high,
even though the presence of national parks serves to curb certain types of economic develop-
ment. See National Parks Poll, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N, http://www.npca.org/pro
tecting-our-parks/policy-legislation/national-parks-poll.html (last visited May 21, 2015) (citing to
a Hart Research Associates and North Star Opinion Research study that found that ninety-five
percent of voters see “protecting and supporting the National Parks” as an appropriate role for
the federal government).
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course the latter option would require payment of “just
compensation.”
While it is not a foregone conclusion that stronger UGBs or PFAs
would have met with long-term success, it is evident that the failure to
consistently enforce and oversee the programs ultimately led to their
demise.363  Instead, policymakers could create a meaningful, incentive-
based program through a National Land Use Planning Act, with
UGBs and PFAs that carried teeth in their enforcement mechanisms
and consistency in their implementation.
Of course, in order for these tools to achieve maximum long-term
impact, we might be better off removing them from the hands of lo-
cally elected officials who face the pressures of fluctuating political
sentiment.  A nonpartisan, appointed commission or a politically insu-
lated committee might actually be the best actor to oversee and en-
force the UGB or PFA if this is the route that future land use planning
efforts take.
C. Reform Private Property Rights
Though it would clearly take a complicated revamping of many
areas of American law (not to mention cultural expectations), it is
rarely—if ever—suggested that the United States reexamine its indi-
vidualistic conception of private property rights.  The historic and le-
gal ways that private property rights are construed in the United
States, namely, the robust “bundle of rights” provided to persons who
own property and the accompanying sense of entitlement manifested
in the “American Dream,” both pose significant impediments to sus-
tainable, coordinated land use management.
A movement—both social and legal—to educate Americans
about the destructive nature of our expectations concerning land use
may contribute significantly to a transformation in the way that land is
treated.  There is simply not enough suitable land, water, or open
space for everyone to have the idyllic single-family home, white picket
fence, and beautiful scenery.  More and more, the U.S. population is
moving to urban settings.364  In fact, this movement into the city is also
linked to positive health outcomes, including a longer life expec-
tancy.365  Compact cities come with more socioeconomic opportunity
363 See supra Parts II.D.3–4.
364 See, e.g., Mohammad Arzaghi & Anil Rupasingha, Migration as a Way to Diversify:
Evidence from Rural to Urban Migration in the U.S., 53 J. REGIONAL SCI. 690, 693 (2013).
365 See Steve Hargreaves, America’s Most Sprawling Cities, CNN MONEY (Apr. 2, 2014, 1:49
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/02/news/economy/sprawling-cities/index.html.
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and healthier, longer lives.366  Without a realization that the quality of
our lives is interconnected, and a sense of the shared nature of respon-
sibility for preserving resources, lasting smart growth will prove elu-
sive.  We will quite simply run out of space and resources if people
continue to live with the land use expectations that they can have it
all, no matter the consequences on their neighbors.367  A shift in popu-
lar sentiment, if robust enough, may also lead to political pressure—a
movement that would alleviate some of the difficulties in instigating
lasting and meaningful growth management reform thus far.
CONCLUSION
Continued movement towards smart growth in America is imper-
ative if we are to maintain basic fairness with regard to property rights
as well as continue to use land in a way that is sustainable and respon-
sible.  While several states have utilized a number of different struc-
tures in seeking smart growth, almost all of them have met with
unintended consequences and dramatically increased litigation, partic-
ularly because political sensitivities around land use decisions run hot
in multiple directions.  If we are to be successful in achieving enduring
smart growth over the long term, it is time to stop half-heartedly
choosing from a menu of failed options.  Rather, we must devise ways
to remove smart growth decisions from local politics, borrow success-
ful smart growth tools from other states, and have the courage to stay
the course when we pass responsible land use legislation.  We must
implement regulation consistently, and even consider the idea of a
federal National Land Use Planning Act.  More radically, it is time we
seriously rethink the nature of private property rights in the United
States so that all citizens understand that our land use decisions im-
pact everyone else around us.  If we fail to take affirmative steps to-
day, our efforts to achieve smart growth will never live up to their
name.
366 Id.
367 By way of illustration, numerous cities and developments in the American Southwest
such as Phoenix, Las Vegas, Palm Springs, and Tucson, have contributed to the drying of the
Colorado River delta and drought conditions on the Navajo Indian Reservation. See generally
Brian Clark Howard, 8 Mighty Rivers Run Dry from Overuse, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, available at
http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/photos/rivers-run-dry/ (last visited May
21, 2015).
